NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT

UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS NETWORK'S VALUE TO COUNTERTERRORISM: A BALANCED SCORECARD APPROACH

By: **Michael Ameche, and**
Shaun Carrizales
December 2013

Advisors: **Kathryn Aten,**
Tom Albright,
Mike Jones,
Matt Jacobs

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY ***(Leave blank)***	**2. REPORT DATE** December 2013	**3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED** MBA Professional Report	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE UNDERSTANDING THE GLOBAL SPECIAL OPERATIONS NETWORK'S VALUE TO COUNTERTERRORISM: A BALANCED SCORECARD APPROACH		**5. FUNDING NUMBERS**	
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael Ameche and Shaun Carrizales			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		**8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER**	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		**10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER**	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB protocol number ____N/A____.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		**12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE** A	

13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)

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This model translates the strategy into clear objectives at the operational and tactical level. The model is based on a performance measurement tool for strategy implementation widely accepted in the private sector called the Balanced Scorecard. We introduce the natural unit of policy options created as a measure. This non-financial measure is a modification the traditional balanced scorecard and supports use by USSOCOM elements in the Global War on Terrorism. We argue that implementation of the model presented in this paper could enhance operational assessment and resource allocation decision-making by enabling assessment of the health of U.S. policy options in a region and identifying USSOCOM activities that can positively influence the quality and the quantity of those options.

14. SUBJECT TERMS Global Special Operations Forces Network (GSN), Special Operations Forces (SOF), United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), security force assistance (SFA), building partner capacity (BPC), Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), Balanced Scorecard (BSC), Robert Kaplan, strategy map	**15. NUMBER OF PAGES** 111
	16. PRICE CODE

17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	**18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE**	**19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT**	**20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT**
Unclassified	Unclassified	Unclassified	UU

NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18

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Michael Ameche, Lieutenant, United States Navy
Shaun Carrizales, Lieutenant, United States Navy

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 2013

Authors: Michael Ameche

Shaun Carrizales

Approved by: Kathryn Aten, PhD

Thomas Albright, PhD

William R. Gates, PhD
Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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LIST OF FIGURES

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would also like to acknowledge Professor K. J. Aten and Professor Thomas L Albright, and Michael W. Jones for their expertise, patience, encouragement, and mentoring.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	area of responsibility
AQ	Al Qaeda
BSC	Balanced Scorecard
CCJO	Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CJSOTF	Commander Joint Special Operations Task Force
CO	commanding officer
CoM	Chief of Mission
CONUS	continental United States
DFAS	Defense Financial Accounting Service
DHS	U.S. Department of Homeland Security
DIME	Diplomatic information military economic (instruments of national power)
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DOS	Department of State
DSG	Defense Strategic Guidance
GCC	geographic combatant command
GSN	Global Special Operations Forces Network
HUMINT	human intelligence
JCET	Joint Combined Exercise for Training
JSOTF	Joint Special Operations Task Force
JTF	joint task force
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSC	National Security Council
PFE	partner force evaluation
RSCC	Regional Special Operations Forces Coordination Centers
SFA	security forces assistance
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SRS	strategic readiness system

TF	task force
TSOC	Theater Special Operations Command
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
USSOF	United States Special Operations Forces

I. INTRODUCTION

> The fact of the matter is, that [counterterrorism] piece—that we do better than anybody in the world—… is a small part of our portfolio, the broader part of our portfolio is how we build capability, how we link with our allies and our partners overseas so that we can help them take care of their problems so we don't have to end up doing [counterterrorism].
>
> Admiral (ADM) McRaven: speech on the Global Special Operations Network

A. LESSONS IN PARTNERSHIP

Special Operations Forces (SOF) operate in complex environments that demand a wide spectrum of responses to address global threats to U.S. interests. Admiral McRaven's objective to create and expand the Global Special Operations Network (GSN) is traced back to U.S. strategy to build partner capacity and to create options to deal with unpredictable future situations. The U.S. learned from years of experience in Iraq and Afghanistan that civil unrest leads to very complicated situations. Each difficult situation requires individual assessment of various options that will resolve it successfully. Events, such as the following, suggest that global unrest will continue and this necessitates expanding the GSN.

In 2011 in sovereign Iraq, the Iranian-supported Southern Shia militias continually attacked U.S. forces with improvised explosive devices and small arms. In the North, Al Qaeda-affiliated Sunnis attempted to do the same. Several factors contributed to an extremely complicated security situation. Dealing with the situation required partnership.

The population included Shia, Sunni, Christian, semi-autonomous Kurds, Syrians, tribes, and more. Several security forces reflected similar religious-ethnic diversity, unique loyalties, and territories: Sunni Police units, Shia Iraqi Army units, Shia Iraqi Army Special Forces units, and Kurdish Iraqi Army units and militias. These units drove to achieve their own individual objectives, but did not collectively align with U.S. objectives.

Coupled with the complexity of religious-ethnic diversity, the Iraqi government imposed a moratorium on unilateral operations (U.S. only). Adding to the complexity, SOF Iraqi army partner forces were Shia and would not attack other Shia's in the south. This put the U.S. in a dilemma. Additionally, U.S. government further complicated the range of operations by restricting force composition and size.

The U.S. worked towards its strategic goals by building individual and coalition partnerships. SOF and Iraqi forces faced Sunni and Shia extremist group networks across Iraq. Their mission was to ensure security during the drawdown and limit the extremist damage to withdrawing U.S. troops through counterterrorism operations. Special operations units assigned to Operation New Dawn supported the Iraqis through Foreign Internal Defense (FID) training and by outfitting Iraqi forces with sufficient equipment to conduct operations and information sharing. These special operations units desired to fulfill their mission. For this they required a partner force capable of taking action with them or on their behalf against enemy networks when faced with security crises or presented with intelligence-based opportunities.

These 2011 events in Iraq highlight the dynamic environment and need to develop the GSN. The U.S. experience in Iraq suggests that special operations units need partners to increase options to fulfill their mission. Because of indigenous forces, conflicting loyalties, and jurisdiction, SOF operators maintained multiple partner forces. Depending on where the target was located in the area of operations, U.S. special operations (USSOF) units matched the target with a partner force willing and able to attack that target. Choices were based on geographic location, religious-ethnicity, political differences, and the level of cooperation with the U.S. By investing training, time, and resources, USSOF units developed relationships with several local security forces. When a security crisis arose, such as the Al Qaeda (AQ) summer assault on the government building in Kirkuk, USSOF units met the crisis with a partner that was willing and capable of responding. Similarly, when intelligence presented the opportunity to capture a senior AQ leader as he transited from Syria on his way to Baghdad, forces in Mosul acted rapidly. USSOF accomplished this by being prepared with a partner force able to

penetrate the fiercely territorial and extremely dense urban neighborhoods of Iraq's second largest city. These events demonstrate the value of a GSN that creates activities leading to options.

B. BACKGROUND

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) commander, Admiral McRaven, proposed after winning the current fight in Afghanistan, "Expanding the Global Special Operations Network" is the next highest priority. Admiral McRaven repeatedly stated "we can't surge trust," which means the U.S. must be vigilant in developing relationship with its partners. Admiral McRaven's priorities align with the Secretary of Defense's January 2012 *Defense Strategic Guidance*, calling for an agile, flexible, and ready Joint Force capable of capitalizing on networks and inter-dependency to maximize effectiveness in deterrence and evolving war (Department of Defense [DoD], 2012a).

USSOCOM led to the United States' effort to combat terrorism on a global scale officially since the *Unified Command Plan* directed USSOCOM to do so in 2004. Unofficially, USSOCOM dealt at the front line of innovation with irregular security threats since its inception in 1987. USSOCOM organizes its forces into small units (two-man teams and larger); then uniquely positions them to tap into deep cultural experiences without overwhelming the units' authority, resources, or causing local, political or diplomatic backlashes.

USSOCOM deals with modern security threats without creating a large footprint through the innovative GSN mechanism. Admiral McRaven described a force that addresses the current threat of irregular warfare with limited resources and a decade's stress of sustained combat operations. The Secretary of Defense echoed McRaven's observations when he issued the following statement:

> The United States is unlikely to repeat another Iraq or Afghanistan—that is, forced regime change followed by nation building under fire—anytime soon. But that does not mean it may not face similar challenges in a variety of locales. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner

> governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention. In this kind of effort, the capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as important as its own, and building their capacity is arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does itself.
>
> Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, January 2009 (Livingston, 2011)

In 2012 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the *Capstone Concept For Joint Operations* (CCJO). The proposal is described as a "globally postured Joint Force that quickly combines capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations" (DoD, 2012a). Partners typically share some type of common security critical to the United States. USSOCOM recommends that geographic combatant commanders validate SFA partner's requirements. Partnering reduces risk and involvement of U.S. troops.

Providing Security Forces Assistance (SFA) to U.S. allies is a key mechanism for establishing partnerships. SFA involves allocating resources to partners to counter current security threats and to deter future threats. Under DoD direction, SOCOM is the joint proponent for SFA. This means it leads the development of joint doctrine, training, and education relevant to SFA activities conducted within a host country from the service level down to individual units (Livingston, 2011). Between 2006 and 2012, the U.S. provided $1.8b in National Defense Authorization Act section 1206 funds to 41 countries and 15 multi-lateral programs for the specific purposes of counter-terrorism and stability operations (National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA], 2013).

GSN provides security forces assistance (SFA) to U.S. allies. This may serve to expand and strengthen the network. Partnering through SFA can create an operational infrastructure of partnerships that can be employed in future operations. A corps element of the GSN is the infrastructure of U.S. and foreign SOF partnerships.

C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

This project supports Admiral McRaven's vision to expand the GSN and its ability to increase options to guarantee a higher probability of success. The limited

resources provided by Congress require DoD entities to justify the money allocated for DoD commands. To support these requirements, this project addresses the following questions:

- What metrics are appropriate to measure or gauge the effectiveness of a SOF network?
- How can lower tier USSOCOM units' activities assess performance?
- How should the value provided by the GSN be measured?

This project presents a strategy map and Balanced Scorecard (BSC) tool to link and measure leading activities and efforts of the multi-faceted USSOCOM as it seeks to operate under the guidance of its commander and to expand the GSN. The strategy map and BSC offer a partial answer to the question: "To what end should we expand the GSN?" as proposed by the Joint Special Operations University in its *Research Topics 2014*. For USSOCOM, the BSC and strategy map can be models to assess and direct the activities and performance of units conducting the SFA mission. They can also guide activities and efforts during the deployment cycle to support the GCC strategy. Additionally, this project provides a baseline measurement from which to initiate future research and additional analysis.

D. SCOPE OF RESEARCH

The scope of this project is limited to the development of a strategy map and BSC to define links amongst four perspectives (decision maker, customer, internal, and leaning & growth). Furthermore, the assignment of measurable objectives to each perspective to increase options for GSN decision makers is analyzed. The project includes a review of relevant literature to provide the reader with a general understanding of the strategy map and the BSC concepts, significant characteristics, and the potential benefits USSOCOM could gain through the effective implementation of the BSC. It is assumed that the reader has a basic knowledge of business, management, accounting concepts and terminology, and general military terminology.

E. SUMMARY

The implementation of a strategy map and BSC with standardized metrics will enhance USSOCOMs ability to fulfill the mandate to *expand the Global SOF Network*. Establishing a model that gauges the capability and capacity of partnered nations will allow leaders to focus on specific areas that need to be addressed to build our partners and partnerships to meet global threats together. Furthermore, pioneering the development and implementation of a BSC—a widely adopted financial tool in the private sector—to assess non-financial value, such as "military *options* created," is compatible with the creative mindset required of USSOCOM operations.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

A. THE GLOBAL SOF NETWORK AND SPECOPS STRATEGY

The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) intends to build a global network of special operations forces capable of meeting the requirements set forth by a changing national strategy. To understand the origins of the new strategy, consider the dominating news headlines regarding the United States Department of Defense over the past five years. Significant changes are happening as a result of a reduced presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Budget Control Act of 2011, and a strategic re-balancing towards Asia. These changes are occurring against a backdrop of numerous security threats, ranging from an increasingly assertive China to non-state extremist networks in the Horn of Africa, Central Asia, and rogue nation-states in the Middle East. As a result of these dynamics, in 2012 the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs released guidance on future American defense priorities. After a decade of sustained conflict, they seek to reshape the force, maintain a force capable of dealing with today's threats, and share the burden of cost and risk with strategic partners (DoD, 2012a).

With strategy being formulated at such high levels within the U.S. Government, how can lower tier units within USSOCOM, who are responsible for implementation, develop their activities and assess their performance? Whenever top-down strategic guidance is imposed, there is ultimately an inflection point where members of the organization tasked with implementation, take ownership of the strategy when planning and executing everyday activities. The Balanced Scorecard is an effective tool to interpret strategies, develop operations, and to assess performance towards obtaining strategic objectives. This project will establish a model with which to evaluate the network of special operations strategy. It will also provide a starting point for examples of performance measurement in line with strategy that should be ultimately modified and tailored to geographic or culturally-specific networks.

We begin with a review of existing documentation regarding the Global Special Operations Network (GSN) strategy and literature regarding the Balanced Scorecard

(BSC). We then generate a strategy map that examines key perspectives on the GSN and how they perceive success. This strategy map identifies the creation of military and informational options, aggregation of the special operations forces (SOF) 11 core activities, as the primary purpose of the GSN. The strategy map examines strategically linked activities conducted by SOF and traces their impact on the overall purpose of the GSN. Once this link is established, we suggest performance metrics to assess successful activities in the Balanced Scorecard. We conclude with discussions and observations from this process.

1. Expand the Global SOF Network

> Extremist networks squeezed in one country migrate to others. Terrorist propaganda from a cell in Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit or Delhi … Technology and globalization have made our countries and our communities interdependent and interconnected.
>
> Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, 2012, May 23, Special Operations Gala

USSOCOM responds to changes in the national strategy by expanding the GSN. Recent changes in the national strategy made by decision makers, including the president and the Secretary of Defense, influence USSOCOMs formulation of the GSN strategy among other factors. These factors can be traced to a list of requirements described in the *Defense Strategic Guidance* (DSG) and the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) (DoD, 2012a). The necessity for changes in U.S. strategy is driven by a decade of extended conflict, the Budget Control Act of 2011, and increasingly networked threats (DoD, 2012e). The strategic requirements outlined in these documents stress a smaller, more flexible, joint force that is globally postured to capitalize on inter-dependencies of partners and networked so that it can quickly combine capabilities in response to crisis and opportunities (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). USSOCOM designs its strategy to complement the broader national strategy set forth by the DSG and the CCJO.

Cost effectiveness is an aspect that makes USSOCOM uniquely capable of meeting the requirement, as stated by the NSC, for a smaller, leaner, joint force. Justification for SOF as the smaller, leaner force is echoed by Linda Robinson, a Senior

Fellow for U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Robinson identifies that SOF's impact in the global war on terrorism has been significant, while USSOCOMs share of the defense budget remains relatively small at four percent (Robinson, 2013). Despite financial and risk constraints, a distinguishing feature of SOF compared to conventional forces is SOFs ability to conduct missions successfully within financial constraints (The future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, 2012). SOFs lower cost and higher battlefield effect make it ideally suited to meet specific requirements set forth by national security decision makers in the updated national strategy.

a. A Network of Partners

A global posture that can capitalize on partner inter-dependencies will require SOF to be a networked and disaggregated force highly educated in its partner's national security objectives and limitations. ADM McRaven points out that SOF forces are currently in over 75 countries with plans to expand (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). This global presence acts as a sensor that continually updates the entire U.S. military on enemy threats and, equally as important, the risks partners have in shared challenges. To promote partnership, ADM McRaven suggests that the GSN should build trusting, lasting relationships and new ways to solve these encounters together (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). A key point here is that during future security challenges, the U.S. should not have to go it alone and, thus, the U.S. should diffuse risk and cost among partners. Strong relationships do not occur overnight. These relationships must be created over time and be in place before the next security challenge hits. A key tenet of expanding the GSN is the inclusion and engagement of foreign partners to capitalize on inter-dependencies.

ADM McRaven includes building a partner's capacity as a critical element to prevent emerging local security threats from becoming regional threats (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). Robinson calls for SOF to implement a more organized approach toward these partnerships through coordinated engagement (Robinson, 2013). Defense Secretary Robert Gates observed that while

unilateral military accomplishment during the war on terror has been significant, just as important is how well the U.S. assists and supports partners to defend and govern their own countries (Livingston, 2011). Robinson identifies partners as ranging from "government forces, to informal groups like tribes, or community defense groups or populations" (Special Operations Forces, 2012). SOF is the most capable of Defense Department components at implementing the new national strategy, but it will require some adjustments in their organizational focus.

b. Providing Special Operations Capability

In a statement to Congress, ADM McRaven emphasized that USSOCOM always requires approval from the NSC, GCCs, and the chiefs of mission (CoM) (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). ADM McRaven further stated that the purpose of SOCOM strategy will be to, "provide GCCs and Chiefs of Mission with improved special operations capacity, aligning structures, processes and authorities to enable a network" (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). USSOCOM's strategy is well aligned with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff request to "build a stronger network to defeat the networks that confront us" (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). As the force re-postures towards a new strategy with greater emphasis on partnership, ADM McRaven reiterated that SOF works with GCCs and for decision makers at the CoM level and in the NSC. In the commander's forward to the SOF operating concept, McRaven envisions future interdependent and networked forces presenting innovative strategic options to the national leadership.

The previous sections summarize the strategies, antecedent requirements, and follow on constraints set forth by the nation's decision makers and planners. We examined the specific USSOCOM strategy of expanding the Global SOF Network. This would meet national requirements of a smaller, more flexible, joint force that is globally postured to capitalize on inter-dependencies of partners. Also, it would be networked so

that it can quickly combine capabilities in response to crisis and opportunities. The GCC and CoM will employ this Global SOF Network as they deal with irregular threats in their respective areas of responsibility (AOR).

B. THE BALANCED SCORECARD

1. Purpose

Historically, it has been extremely difficult to translate strategy into measurable performance. Robert Kaplan and David Norton's 1996 book, *The Balanced Scorecard: Translating Strategy into Action*, presented the BSC as a tool to help assess and report an organization's performance in relation to its strategy. The book described how management can choose multiple financial measures that reflect performance, as well as non-financial measures that can be leading indicators for future performance. Kaplan and Norton suggested the BSC is a management tool intended to help organizations succeed in achieving their strategy. Specifically, there are four ways the BSC helps an organization achieve its strategy: The BSC helps an organization explain its vision and strategy; links strategic objectives and measures; plans, sets targets, and aligns strategic initiatives; and enhances strategic feedback and learning (Caudle, 2008). Success is achieved by integrating these four factors and by selecting specific measures of activities that have a direct effect on the achievement of the organization's strategy. The measures and strategy are linked in a cause and effect manner. This can increase or decrease the bottom line based on the measurement drivers. Below is an example of how a private sector, for-profit organization cause and effect relationship may be approached:

- Increased employee training leads to
- Decreased employee errors, leading to
- Increased product quality and efficiency, which leads to
- Improved customer satisfaction, finally leading to
- Increased sales and profits.

The BSC has been studied in a variety of for-profit environments, with a balanced set of measures tied to different points of focus within organizations. The most commonly used focal points are: learning and growth capabilities, the efficiency of

internal processes, customer value, and financial success. Kaplan explains a key point: There is no reason that an organization must use the four perspectives; each organization can and should develop its own dimensions of importance. The four perspectives can serve as a guide to assist in developing a linked set of metrics tied to U.S. military strategy (Niven, 2003). Sometimes important metrics may not easily fit within one (or more) of the four perspectives, or a certain perspective may not be relevant to an organization's business environment, including the focus on profits. When a disparity between the traditional BSC model and an organization's goals arise, customizing the BSC is a viable option (Niven, 2008).

a. Barriers

In 1999, a story in fortune magazine, Niven argued that 70 percent of companies failed from bad execution—not a bad strategy (Niven, 2008). Niven notes that even successful organizations have difficulties implementing strategy (2008). He further discusses four barriers: vision, people, management, and resources that, if not addressed, can impede an organization from achieving its strategy (Niven, 2003). Breaking down these barriers increases the likelihood of success. As explained in the next section, Niven provides examples of how to overcome each barrier (Niven, 2003).

Promoting an environment with employee empowerment, dialogue, and information sharing allows employees at all levels to become involved with the overall vision and direction of the organization.

b. People

Creating incentives for working tends to increase motivation and the desire to excel. It is important, however, not to sacrifice the long-term strategic goals for a short term gain.

c. Management

Developing managers involved with subordinates' everyday activities and promoting an environment that allows two-way dialogue is vital. This method directly ties everyone to the organization's vision.

d. Resource

The majority of companies do not realize how closely linked their budget is to strategy. The strategy should drive the activities for which the budget is allocated. A budget should be focused on the objectives the organization is trying to accomplish rather than constraining the organization.

Identifying the strengths of a company is an important element when implementing the BCS because it allows the ability to focus those strengths on weaknesses or barriers impeding the strategy.

2. Application

The BSC provides a model to link employee action to the leader's vision and strategies (Niven, 2008.). Organizations first need to develop a strategy map: This defines a path to move an organization from its current to its desired position. The strategy map is comprised of objectives. In the next step, organizations break the objectives into measures that quantify progress on the objectives. These measures comprise the BSC. That is, the Balanced Scorecard contains the performance measures that monitor progress, allowing the organization to track towards their objectives (Niven, 2008).

The BSC is a system comprised of both the strategy map of objectives and the BSC of measures. The system, however, is not called both the Strategy Map and Balanced Scorecard model because the Strategy Map originated from the efforts of the early Balanced Scorecard adopters. These early adopters initially struggled to envision the Balanced Scorecard without a clear path of objectives, which facilitated the creation of the strategy map (Niven, 2008). For the remainder of this project, we will use the term Balanced Scorecard to refer to both the Balanced Scorecard and the strategy map.

3. Use in Complex Organizations

Kaplan conducted a research project with 12 companies to discover new methods of performance measurement. Leaders in these 12 companies believed that their financial measures of performance were hindering their ability to create value. Kaplan and Norton

hypothesized that financial performance measures were not as modern as the current business enterprise (Niven, 2008.). Though the original intent of the Balanced Scorecard was to balance a firm's financial data with drivers that focused on the future value of the organization, more companies are now using the Balanced Scorecard as a means to align short-term actions with their strategy (Niven, 2008). Since 1996, when Kaplan and Norton published the Balanced Scorecard book, over half of all Fortune 1000 companies have adopted the Balanced Scorecard (Niven, 2008). Along with the numerous fortune 1000 companies that adopted the BSC, so have several government entities. The following three government entities have adopted the BSC.

4. Balanced Scorecards Used in Government

a. Department of Homeland Security

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recognized that the BSC could convert an organization's mission and business strategy into a limited number of specific objectives that could be linked and measured operationally (Caudle, 2008). Research by DHS uncovered that Kaplan and Norton's recognition that the BSCs for public sector organizations were not completely congruent with those of for profit companies (Caudle, 2008). Government and nonprofit organizations are not designed for financial gain. Therefore, in these organizations' BSCs, the financial perspective did not necessarily belong at the top of the hierarchy. For the public sector, the value creation process targeted public sector customers, taxpayers, and fiduciary outcomes. Kaplan recommended placing financial and customer perspectives at the top in a co-equal status, both dependent on the mission of the organization (Caudle, 2008).

Figure 1. Sample BSC (from Caudle, 2003).

b. NRO

A less known government organization, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), has also adopted the BSC. NRO is responsible for acquiring and operating the world's most advanced space-based intelligence capabilities (National Reconnaissance Office [NRO], 1999). Previously a classified operation, NRO was responsible for providing this service to the national and military leaders of the United States in a classified environment for almost 30 years (NRO, 1999). NRO implemented the BSC to align their goals in four primary areas: customer satisfaction, process improvement, financial management, and employee satisfaction (NRO, 1999). Embedded in each of the four categories, specific goals were defined that created a "one team" approach to support NRO's attainment of its future desired state (NRO, 1999). NRO continues to use the BSC today.

c. Army

Shortly after the BSC was introduced in the early 1990s, the U.S. Army began using it to assess whether troops were adequately equipped to deploy (Unknown, 2013). The U.S. Army is a large and complex organization that, like the previous examples, is not a profit-based organization. It found the BSC to be a good fit (Unknown, 2013). The BSC allowed the Army to focus on its non-financial performance to give an overall picture of its strengths and weaknesses—rather than its balance sheet. Based on the success of the BSC, the Army created the Strategic Readiness System (SRS).

d. Strategic Readiness System (SRS)

On March 13, 2002 the Army Chief of Staff Gen. Erik K. Shinseki approved the Army Scorecard. It is now the foundation for the Strategic Readiness System (SRS). The SRS has changed how the Army manages and reports readiness and it is a critical component of the Army's overall transformation.

5. Success of the Balanced Scorecard

The U.S. Army's success in incorporating the BSC was such that other American military organizations, including Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Department of the Army now use the BSC as a focal point for logistical planning (Posture Statement of the United States Army, 2003). The Army identified why the BSC has been a successful tool for evaluation.

- It clarifies strategies and communicates to the organization
- It identifies key internal processes that will drive strategic success
- It aligns investments in people, technology, and organizational capital for the greatest impact. (Posture Statement of the United States Army, 2003)

The previous examples illustrate the utility of the BSC approach in government organizations. In particular, these examples emphasize the use of the BSC to measure non-financial objectives. We thus draw on the BSC approach to develop a model for assessing the value of the GSN.

C. WHAT GETS MEASURED, GETS DONE

> I often say that when you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meager and unsatisfactory kind. If you cannot measure it, you cannot improve it.
>
> Lord Kelvin 1883 (Kaplan, 1993)

Noting the success of the BSC outside of traditional for profit firms, we decided to apply it to the strategy of a SOF network. Implementing the scorecard to advance USSOCOM strategy seems a good fit due to the complexity of both the strategy and the organization that will implement it. The USSOCOM strategy is extremely complex for several reasons. The strategy seeks to achieve gains in intangible areas, with relatively less people and those who formulated the strategy are not responsible for implementing it. When dealing with this level of complexity, identifying key activities and, more importantly, measuring and recording the effects of those activities will assist members of the organization in assessing their performance.

1. Complicated Things to Measure

The central objectives of the strategy are difficult to measure. Measurement difficulty challenges those tasked with implementing the strategy. In summary, the forward-looking *SOF Operating Concept* states that the objectives of the GSN are to: understand the human aspects of partners, the enemy and the conflict; build partner capacity; and to build trust amongst partners (United States Special Operations Command [USSOCOM], 2013). Unlike typical military objectives, such as seizure of territory, skill proficiency, or maintenance readiness, the objectives of the GSN are very difficult to measure and assess. Assessing progress without a known, measurable point of reference makes “understanding of a partner” or “trust between them and yo” difficult. It could be compared to swimming in the open ocean without view of land. If there are no visual points of reference, the swimmer has a hard time gauging speed or direction.

Further complicating these strategies, is the requirement that those tasked with taking action must make assumptions in order to succeed. The belief that gaining and

maintaining partner support against common enemies can be achieved, and that SOF can generate influence on those partners to act is an example of such an assumption. The networked nature of future threats makes them increasingly complex (National Intelligence Council [NIC], 2012). Individual access to information is at its highest in human history (NIC, 2012). This access to information and involvement in networks empowers U.S. enemies, making them unpredictable and more difficult to deal with than previously. Understanding these inter-dependency connections and generating influence on them will be extremely challenging. By quantifying the effects of activities towards achievement of objectives, the BSC may assist leaders in monitoring the accuracy and relevancy of assumptions.

a. Organizational Complexity

The USSOCOM strategy seeks to counter the terrorist threat. The U.S. has fought this threat over the last decade with fewer people and resources. The nation's response to terrorism threats since 9-11 has involved large-scale contingency operations in multiple theaters. Troop levels required to respond to these threats has at times exceeded 180,000 in Iraq and Afghanistan alone, yet the number of deployed special operators in FY2013 was only 12,000 in about 70 countries (Robinson, 2013). This disparity represents a significant change and increases the complexity of the problem facing SOF as they implement the SOF network strategy. It also represents the disaggregated nature of the small footprint approach advocated by many of the strategists designing the GSN.



Figure 2. Troop Levels for Overseas Contingency Operations

b. Many Implementers

The highest levels of the government and military formulated SOCOM's strategy. USSOCOM's strategists are in a unique position to assess the big picture. Appropriately, USSOCOM set a direction for the organization. Now, the members of the organization must interpret this strategy of "expand the GSN" and then implement it. The 12,000 members of the USSOCOM organization implementing this strategy will do so within a complex organization with a diverse set of capabilities (Robinson, 2013). The lower tiers of the USSOCOM organization must take ownership of the strategy at some point. Quantifying their activities will allow them to better understand the effects of their actions. The examples discussed previously suggest that the BSC is an appropriate tool to encourage ownership of SOCOM's strategy at every level of the organization.

USSOCOM intends to meet requirements set forth by the National Defense strategy by establishing a network of partners called the Global SOF Network or GSN. This strategy is a new initiative for a complex organization. The BSC is a proven

tool used by Fortune 1000 companies to link strategy with action and to measure performance. Organizations have successfully used the BSC to tie strategy to everyday activities. This tool incorporates the entire organization into one team striving towards the objectives congruent with the strategy by measuring performance towards the goal. In the recent past, the BSC has had increased popularity with government entities. We adopted the BSC approach to develop a model for assessing the value of the GSN.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHOD

We began this project with the general overall question: Can the value or effectiveness of a SOF network be measured or quantified? If so, what metrics are appropriate to measure or gauge the effectiveness of a SOF network? With these questions in mind, we reviewed DoD and USSOCOM strategic guidance and commander posture statements to gain an overall understanding of the problem and to develop an approach to answer the question. We adopted a top-down theorizing approach to develop a strategy map and Balanced Scorecard.

Top-down theorizing begins with examining existing knowledge to discern a problem between divergent perspectives and then finding a solution to the problem. Using Top-down theorizing involves re-examining the norms that created the problem to promote divergent thinking (*opportunal thinking)* and *generative strength* and, thereby, provide the *potential* to generate new theoretical insights in the form of hypotheses (Sheperd, 2011). These hypotheses can be tested by collecting and analyzing data of interest (discussed in a follow on section). Admiral McRaven created the Operation Performance Team (OPT) to collect and analyze how to implement the GSN. USSOCOM identifies both problems and solutions in today's environment using historical information to create a top-down approach.

The BSC literature prescribes the following process for developing a BSC to accomplish critical management processes. This process is broken into four categories: Clarifying and translating strategy, Communicating and linking, Planning and target setting, and strategic feedback and learning.

1. Clarifying and Translating the Vision and Strategy

Clarifying and translating the vision and strategy begins with the senior executives translating business strategy into specific strategic objectives. Their job is to determine the focus of the company to ensure objectives drivers (financial, market share,

profitability) strive to meet the objectives (Kaplan, 1996). The interpretation must be clear down the chain to every employee. This translation of the strategy is communicated in many different forms.

2. Communicating and Linking

Continuous communication is accomplished through interaction, newsletters, bulletin boards, and emails to signal reinforcement of objectives (Kaplan, 1996). Reiteration through different media reinforces the goals of upper management through repetition.

3. Planning and Target Setting

Management conducts initial Planning of goals prior to determining the objectives to measure. When developing the goals, traditionally setting goals for a three- to five-year time frame will allow for proper implementation of the BSC and determine how successfully the drivers meet the set objectives (Kaplan, 1996). Once goals have been established and translated to the company receiving feedback to determine if the objectives and measures have been properly planned and attainable.

4. Strategic Feedback and Learning

Strategic feedback and learning is the most important aspect of the BSC: expressing a shared vision, supplying strategic feedback, and facilitating strategy in learning (Kaplan, 1996). Integrating feedback helps management reassess the objective and measures to guide the company towards the strategy.

As a research team, we initially brainstormed and drew conceptual maps. We then brainstormed with larger groups, including peers in the SOF community and faculty in the business school. Discussion with these groups led to refined concepts and a specific scope to research. We recorded ideas on a whiteboard and took detailed notes and digital photos of our draft diagrams and concept maps. As our models developed, we vetted our ideas with our peers through informal presentations to other Naval Postgraduate School students.

Through iterations of brainstorming sessions, we developed a strategy map depicting ADM McRaven's second line of operations—expand the GSN. We then used the strategy map to guide a second round of theorizing as previously described. We brainstormed and drew conceptual maps as a research team; then, with a broader audience, we took notes and photos, and then we vetted our ideas with our peers through informal presentations. Through this process, we identified potential activities associated with each objective and assigned weights to each objective to develop a scorecard.

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IV. STRATEGY MAP

Based on guided discovery in the DA 4500 course, *Special Topics in Strategic Analysis: West Africa & the Global SOF Network*, independent research, contemplation, and discussion with peers, we created the strategy map discussed in this chapter. The map identifies activities associated with an effective SOF network and, more importantly, it suggests that these activities should align to produce a diverse set of options that could be used by decision makers during times of opportunity or crisis. We began our observation with an example of a private sector strategy map designed for profit-seeking firms complete with shareholders, customers, business processes, and employees. We retained the format that posed a challenge question for each perspective, but altered both the rows and the questions to fit a military and, in particular, SOF network purposes. This strategy map is a first step in building the Balanced Scorecard that measures and quantifies the activities identified.

Figure 3 depicts our model explaining how USSOCOM can operationalize the strategic vision to *expand the GSN*. Our model links measurable activities to the creation of value. Measurable activities are performed before deployment to create human and enterprise capital as well as activities performed during deployment. As explained in this section, we conceptualize the value provided by the SOF network as the pool of military and information options available to high-ranking decision makers. As shown in our model, the answer to the question "How is value returned to stakeholders?" is "Through the provision of diverse options to decision-makers." To provide value, options must be likely to succeed, be responsive, connected, and vetted.



Figure 3. Strategy Map

A. DECISION-MAKER PERSPECTIVE

USSOCOM developed the Global Special Operations Forces Network (GSN) in part to provide a smaller, more agile, flexible force capable of achieving military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives in conjunction with U.S. partners in sensitive environments (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). We argue that the value provided by the GSN results in large part from the creation of a diverse pool of options, or potential solutions, supported by unique resources. From this pool, decision makers can select options to achieve informational and military objectives. In the Commander's Foreword to *Special Operations Forces Operating Concept*, ADM McRaven imagines how SOF operates in 2020, "a time when joint, ... multinational, non-

governmental, commercial, and academic partners cooperate, trust each other, and combine their capabilities and authorities to provide national leadership with innovative strategic options" (USSOCOM, 2013).

1. Who are the Decision Makers?

We define decision makers as those responsible for making policy and ordering the application of national power to secure the national interest. Decision makers include members of the President's National Security Council (NSC) such as the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of National Intelligence. Decisions to employ elements of national power are also made by the chiefs of mission in foreign countries. We include members of Congress as decision makers because they influence how the nation applies power through the control of resources and the power of the purse.

When decision makers seek to accomplish policy objectives, preferences for choices are at the heart of the options' concept. The geopolitical environment rarely presents crisis or opportunities for which a nation has one specific and tailored solution (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). The result is that decision makers must evaluate the trade-offs among existing options. Diverse choices enhance the likelihood of finding the optimal policy-strategy match when implementing national power. Additionally, fewer options make actions more predictable and ultimately easier for enemies to counter.

2. What are Options?

We define options as potential solutions to problems that if exercised or triggered, will result in a more favorable outcome than if no action were taken. Options can be categorized by type, each supported and made possible by specific types of resources. Our research draws on a spectrum of partnerships familiar to SOF (The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, 2012). We also use the DIME typology (JP 3-0) to characterize the types of options potentially available to decision makers (DoD, 2011).

a. The Partnership Spectrum

Our strategy map depicts that partnership can be characterized along a spectrum. The lowest level of partnership is unilateral action. This means that the U.S. is the only nation taking part in the action and, thus, no partners are involved. The highest level of partnership is non-attributable, where proxies act in U.S. interests, essentially an operation involving only the partner. In the middle is a range of operations conducted with varying levels of partnership. These levels can be specific numbers of troops allowed in the operation or percentages, as in 15 percent of the forces participating in an operation were American. They can also represent the amount of effort or responsibility that accrues to the partner.

b. DIME Instruments

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, defines strategy as "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives" (DoD, 2011). *Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations*, characterizes instruments of national power as "diplomatic, informational, military, and economic" (DoD, 2011). This characterization is referred to as DIME (DoD, 2011). The DIME typology represents the different instruments through which the U.S. exerts power and influence and takes action.

Each type of instrument and partnership has unique attributes and requires specific types of resources. We use on the partnership spectrum and DIME typology to characterize the different types of options and the resources they encompass and from which they are derived. Our conceptualization of options is summarized in Figure 4.



Figure 4. Types of Options

As shown in Figure 4, we consider options along the full partnership spectrum, but in only two of the DIME categories. *DoD Directive 5100.01* identifies 11 SOF core activities: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, counterinsurgency, special reconnaissance, direct action, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, information operations, counterterrorism, and counter proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (DoD, 2011). For simplicity, we aggregate these core activities into either military or information and diversify them with partnership. We do recognize that SOF can utilize both the diplomatic and economic instruments of power, but do not address them in this paper. It is also not our intent to preclude innovation of instruments that falls outside of our model. Rather, a model necessarily simplifies reality. Our research assumes that when crisis or opportunities occur abroad, the United States will act to promote its interests, and that of its allies, by directly exercising available options or mechanisms.

c. Military Option

The military option involves the use of military force to achieve a national objective. For example, the assignment of a military entity to locate, track, and neutralize terrorist networks would be a military option. The resources from which this option is derived and that it encompasses are primarily military. The assault force and supporting units required to exercise this option are mostly comprised of military members acting within the military organization. Using mostly military assets and authorities, they locate and track terrorists neutralizing the enemy by military force. Another example of a military option would be the application of a no-fly zone enforced by the military. Such a no-fly zone was used during Operation Odyssey Dawn to assist rebels overthrowing Libyan dictator Muamar Qadafi. Although much diplomatic maneuvering to employ the no-fly zone occurred, military entities ultimately enforced the policy decision. Thus, we distinguish this action as a military option.

Military options can be characterized along the spectrum of partnerships. Each type of option has unique characteristics that decision makers analyze when considering employment of each option. These are explained in the following examples.

(1) Military Unilateral (M, U). An example of the unilateral military option is a 90-man assault force comprised entirely of American service members. This force is transported to a target by American helicopters flown by Americans. The entire operation acts on intelligence generated by American assets and processed and analyzed by Americans. Finally, American decision makers approve of the mission. This type of option is nearly always available and has been employed as an instrument of national power frequently in the past two administrations.

From direct action raids to drone strikes, this option has been highly responsive to decision makers. Use of the unilateral military option, however, incurs more risk, consumes more diplomatic capital, and extracts a higher price in blood and treasure than other options. When more American lives are in direct threat and there is the potential of violating treaties and sovereignty, this creates the potential for costs to exceed the benefits of attaining an objective (Howard, 1998). Financial costs of this

particular option may be substantial such that maintaining the capability to have an effective and timely unilateral response to every corner of the globe is costly.

(2) Military Partnered (M, P). A mixture of both American and partner military forces characterize partnered-military options. Partnered-military options are also referred to as the *Indirect Approach* (Robinson, 2013*).* An example could be eight American special operators in two American vehicles, together with 40 partner force soldiers in 10 partner vehicles moving against an enemy objective. American intelligence supported the operation, but the partner forces sought approval for the operation through their own chain of command. The partner government, through diplomatic channels, requested American involvement on the operation due to capability limitations of their armed forces. Approval for specific American involvement in this operation would be granted through the American chain of command to include the CoM.

This option represents shared risk and cost by capitalizing on a situation where the partner and the U.S. have a common threat, and the U.S. has the ability to enhance the partner's capability to deal with it. The risk of casualties as a result of enemy contact is shared with the partner nation through a ratio of 1:5. Because only eight Americans, their vehicles, and their intelligence and support apparatus are involved, the cost associated with the operation is minimized.

The option does represent some trade-offs. Christopher Lamb, in his testimony to Congress, notes, "… when U.S. interests are directly engaged and the results really matter, the tendency is to desire more control over the outcome and therefore have U.S. SOF complete the mission directly" (The Future of U.S. Special Operations Forces, 2012). In the section regarding the *option criteria*, we discuss the trade-offs in detail.

(3) Military Non-attributable (M, N). The non-attributable military option can be characterized by American involvement that is not explicit. For example, a 20-man assault force comprised entirely of partner military forces using their own boats to conduct a maritime interdiction of a terrorist traveling on a ferry through that partner nation's territorial waters. Interdiction is aided by an American aircraft flying out of visual range, but connected with the partner military force by radio and

possibly video. The American aircraft assists the partner by vectoring the assault force towards the terrorist boat and assists the assault force in identifying the wanted terrorist from the other personnel on the civilian boat. The partner nation completely approves the mission. From the people on the boat's perspective, the entire operation is conducted by the partner nation. The operation would not be successful, however, without the direct assistance of the United States.

The benefits of this operation are reduced signature, reduced risk, reduced cost, and reduced chance of civilian casualties blamed on the United States. At no point during the operation are American service members in direct contact with the enemy or the population in the partner nation's country. The risk of an American casualty is zero. The cost of the operation has been reduced to that of operating the aircraft and supplying the partner with communications. The psychological effect of the operation on both the enemy and the population is a net positive for friendly forces. The enemy is confused as to how he was captured and the population views the partner security forces as effective.

The major drawback associated with this type of operation is failure of achieving the objective; in this case, capturing the terrorist. Failure is a function of the partner force's ability to conduct the operation. If the partner is a third world nation, it may not have a sufficient maintenance system for the boats transporting the assault force, or gas to make the boats go. Their chain of command may take too long to approve the mission and, therefore, miss the chance to interdict the ferry in their waters. Other tactical shortcomings in this operation could make it a strategic failure.

d. Information Option

The information option involves the use of information to achieve a net positive result for U.S. interests. An example is an operation to influence the narrative that populations use to understand situations. Another example is strategic messaging that occurs before, during, or after major operations. It can include any operations that use information to set favorable conditions prior to military action. The resources from which these options are derived and that it encompasses can be a combination of military

and civilian. The personnel and intelligence that are used to craft a message or piece of information can be either military or civilian. Likewise, the method of delivery can be either military or civilian.

The importance of the information option is illustrated by General Stanley McChrystal's recounting of the capture of Saddam Hussein (McChrystal, 2013). As recounted by McChrystal, American generals giving a press conference from a captured Iraqi palace released the details of Hussein's capture to the American media. Iraqis perceived the U.S. press reports of these details as evidence of U.S. invaders whooping it up after capturing the deposed dictator. McChrystal posits that a more effective means to release that type of information would have been through Iraqis and into Iraqi media. This mechanism, however, did not exist at the time.

Information options can be characterized along the spectrum of partnerships. When considering employment of each option, decision makers analyze the various options unique characteristics. These are explained with the following examples.

(1) Information Unilateral (I, U). The unilateral information option is illustrated by information generated and delivered by the United States. An example is the propaganda leaflet drop conducted by American military forces prior to the invasion of Kuwait in 1991. The leaflet drop consisted of pieces of paper with a message suggesting the Iraqi forces surrender or risk being killed. The leaflets were dropped from U.S. aircraft and contained a message created by U.S. forces.

The major benefit is that U.S. forces can attrite the enemy without incurring the risk of direct combat. This desirable end-state is achieved by using information instead of military force. A drawback of employing information in this manner is that it is easier for the enemy to decipher the origin of the information and, therefore, employ counter-measures to defeat it. Basically, they know we want them to surrender and can have a pre-planned response such as assassination of troops that try to surrender. The information would be more effective if the origin was disguised as if it came from within.

(2) Information Partnered (I, P). The partnered information option can best be characterized by cooperation with a partner to generate information

and deliver it to key stakeholders. Take for example a security force's wanted poster in a partner nation where several names and faces on the poster are all terrorists the U.S. wants to capture. The names and faces are based on both U.S. and partner intelligence, but the poster is in the partner's language and posted by the partner's security forces.

There are several benefits of delivering information to the population through a partner. Benefits include a reduced signature for American forces. In this situation, the partner's sovereignty is protected because they must agree to the faces and names on their poster. Negatives of this method include a potential dilution of the message; and the partner can alter what appears on the poster. As the partner's control increases, the likelihood of a different message increases.

(3) Information Non-Attributable (I, N). A partner developing information in line with U.S. interests and delivering the information in a manner that cannot be traced back to U.S. involvement characterizes the non-attributable military option. An example would be a partner delivering a message via local media channels that an explosion occurring in a partner country was a suicide bomber, when actually the explosion was a U.S. missile strike aimed at taking out a terrorist cell.

In this example, the information option complements the military missile strike by disguising the event as a negative enemy action. If the U.S. government released this message, the local population would likely not believe the report. By releasing the message through the partner nation's existing media construct, the information becomes non-attributable.

We have discussed several examples of how military and information options can affect achieving national objectives. We have also discussed how both the military and information options are affected by partnership, and sometimes the certainty of their outcomes is reduced by partnership. Each unique combination of instrument and partnership represents costs and benefits that decision makers must weigh when choosing how and when to employ instruments of national power. Since no two situations are the same, it is important for decision makers to have a menu of these options to choose between when seeking to achieve national objectives.

B. CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE

In his 2013 posture statement to Congress, ADM McRaven emphasizes the importance of the GSN meeting geographic combatant commands (GCC) and chiefs of mission (CoM) requirements to deal with security threats (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). By imagining how the GSN should appear to these primary customers, this perspective reveals criteria that options produced by deployed task forces must meet prior to being offered to GCCs and CoMs for approval. These criteria include the likelihood of success, responsiveness, connectivity, and the vetting of an option. When options meet these criteria, they represent how the SOF organization returns value to the primary customer of GCC and CoM.

In Figure 3, the option criteria are the focus of the customer perspective. The presence, intensity, and combination of these criteria are what make each option unique. The deployed task forces found in the internal perspective strive to align their activities to support producing options that meet these criteria. Activities and processes in the internal perspective have varying degrees of association with each criterion as represented by the thickness of lines connecting criteria with activities.



Figure 5. The Value Proposition

1. Who are the Customers?

We identify the customers as the geographic combatant commander and their respective theater special operations commanders. Geographic combatant commanders are typically four-star flag officers of the United States' military, commanding one of the six geographic combatant commands (GCC) that divide the globe into areas of responsibility. GCCs include United States Africa Command, United States Central Command, United States European Command, United States Pacific Command, United

States Northern Command, and United States Southern Command. Each GCC has a respective theater special operations commander (TSOC), who is subordinate to the GCC, and responsible for special operations in the GCC area of operations. These leaders play an important link between civilian decision makers in embassies (CoM) and the NSC and the military members of USSOCOM deployed to Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTF) around the globe. As a link, they receive security and diplomatic priorities from civilian decision makers. They develop campaign strategies to respond to these priorities. The functional units they use to implement these campaign strategies are Joint Special Operations Task Forces.

Decision makers look to the GCCs for solutions to security problems. GCCs look to the TSOCs (and USSOCOM) for SOF-specific solutions (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013). GCCs/TSOCs are essentially brokers of these solutions produced at the JSOTF/TF level and consumed at the decision-maker level. Decision makers will evaluate options based on the criteria found in the value proposition; GCC and TSOCs will only approve, and pass up the chain of command, options that score well on the option criteria level. Since the GCCs and TSOCs look to the JSOTFs for options that score well on the criteria, we suggest the activities of the deployed task forces be aimed at maximizing these option criteria.

2. Option Criteria—The Value Proposition

When choosing the criterion for the customer perspective, we asked ourselves: How should our products appear to our customers? The answer to this question is: Our products should appear as likely to succeed, responsive, vetted, and in consideration of the connectedness of our partners. We found these criteria to be properties of options that the customers value over other methods of achieving national objectives. Essentially, these criteria are both what the customers expect from SOF and how they will measure the overall quality of each option produced by SOF.

The value proposition proposed by this strategy map is that of *Product Leadership* (Niven, 2003). A product-leadership-value-proposition is characterized by an

organization striving to offer simply the best product on the market. By creating options that meet the criterion found in the value proposition, SOF attempts to meet this strategy.

a. Likelihood of Success

Likelihood of success predicts the probability that an option will attain the national interest it intends to attain. An example of an option meeting the likelihood of success criteria is the sheer size of the option as compared to the objective. For instance, a military option consisting of a 90-man assault force would have a high likelihood of success against a terrorist camp containing only five armed personnel. Similarly, consider an information option intended to communicate to the population of a city where 100,000 people live. The method the option uses to deliver the message only has a reach of 20,000. This information option would be perceived has having a low likelihood of success. The skill or training level of the unit involved in an option can measure likelihood of success, but there are many variables that may deem necessary to be measured.

We believe that the customer demands options that have a higher likelihood of success. A high likelihood of success translates to a higher probability the national objective sought will be achieved and their decision to employ the option will be a success. The customer can distinguish preference between options if they have an understanding and measurement of the likelihood of success.

b. Option Responsiveness

The criterion of responsiveness regards the speed of reaction to the decision maker's choice to employ the option. A simple example that explains responsiveness can be found in the steering inputs of a racing car and a ferryboat. When the driver makes the decision to turn the car, he turns the wheel; as he turns the wheel, the car immediately turns. When the ferryboat captain decides to turn the ferryboat, he must account for the lag in time between when he turns the wheel and when the ferryboat begins to turn. In this example, the racecar is more responsive than the ferryboat.

Responsiveness also includes the time it takes the option to maneuver into a position to respond to a crisis or opportunity. Just as a car race is time sensitive, so too are crises and opportunities. The longer a crisis carries on, the greater the impact. Entities attempting to end a crisis wish to do so in a timely manner. The initiator's goal is to protract the crisis. The intelligence associated with opportunities is also time sensitive. To exploit the opportunity, the capitalizer must maneuver an option into place before intelligence is no longer valid. Just as a racecar driver requires a highly responsive steering input in a car race, customers in our model require highly responsive options.

We ascertain that the responsiveness of an option is important to customers (and ultimately decision makers) because of the time sensitivity associated with decisions made during times of crisis and opportunities. A highly responsive option allows decision makers to respond to the time-sensitivity associated with crises and opportunities. The customers can distinguish a preference between two or more options if they have a full understanding and measurement of their responsiveness.

c. Option Connectivity

The connectivity criterion evaluates an option's relationship with its physical access to the socio-political environment. This criterion strives to enhance the understanding of the effects that occur as a result of the decision to employ the option. Highly connected options have a strong relationship with their environment; unconnected options have no relationship with their environment. High connectivity is a positive attribute for information options and can have either negative or positive attributes for military options.

Consider a scenario where time-sensitive intelligence produces the exact geo-location of a wanted terrorist. Decision makers, wanting to capitalize on this opportunity, evaluate the options presented to them by a deployed task force to either kill or capture the terrorist. The deployed task force has two partners they work with in the area the terrorist has been geo-located and evaluates these partners by their connectivity.

Option Alpha uses U.S. forces partnered with foreign military troops of the same tribe and religion as the terrorist. The task force has assessed this partner to be highly connected to the environment that surrounds the target due to tribal and religious connections. Through engagement, they have also assessed this partner to non-concur with striking targets of their own religion. Option Bravo uses U.S. forces partnered with foreign military troops of a separate tribe and different religion. The task force assesses this partner to have less connection to the environment that surrounds the target. They have also assessed this partner believes striking this target is in their best interests. Alpha represents a highly connected option. Bravo represents a less connected option.

Understanding and quantifying this connectivity helps the task force evaluate the trade-offs that occur when choosing to partner with either A, B, or to conduct the mission unilaterally. The task force must weigh the access option A has against the option B's willingness to act. They must also consider the consequences to their relationship with A that partnering with B incurs.

We think the connectivity of an option is valuable to the customer level because it enhances their understanding of the effects that occur as a result of their decision to employ an option. This understanding assists the customer level in predicting the socio-political costs and benefits of using an option. Customers can distinguish preference for particular options by evaluating the connectivity each has with its respective environment.

d. Vetted

Vetted options represent partnership with foreign military units that have been approved by U.S. decision makers through adherence to rules defined by the Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act (Tate, 2011). The law is designed to prevent U.S. assistance to, and involvement with, military units that have been credibly implicated in serious human rights abuses. It is included in the option criteria of the customer level to ensure that guidelines established by stakeholders are met.

U.S. partnership with un-vetted foreign units during either military or informational operations creates risk for civilian leadership. Operational partnership

associates the U.S. with the activities of the partner. Additionally, the U.S. commonly provides assistance to partners during these operations. If a partner has conducted continual human rights violations, the U.S. risks that the association and assistance can be misinterpreted as the U.S. condoning and sponsoring human rights violations.

We believe customers will only choose options that have been vetted because they value the risk mitigation that the vetting process represents. By knowing a partner involved in an option has been vetted, the customer is somewhat assured of a level of conduct associated with employment of the option. Customers can distinguish preference for particular options by evaluating whether or not an option has been vetted.

e. Quality as an Encompassing Term

The term quality can represent the aggregate consideration of all four criteria. If SOF are striving to meet a product-leadership type of strategy, as we have suggested in the value proposition, then they are attempting to present to customers the highest quality product they can produce. The product that SOF produces, both military and informational options, will be evaluated amongst other alternatives such as conventional military response and the do nothing choice. SOF options should appear to the customer level as higher quality than the other options available to decision makers.

f. Control as an Aspect of all Criteria

Control is the ability to exercise the option at the time of choosing. Perfect control constitutes instantaneous action from the point of decision. Poor control causes a delay between the decision to employ the option and the effects of the option on the situation. Delays can arise from any factors that are outside of U.S. control. For instance, delays can be frequent when conducting partnered operations. The example would be the slowness of the partner's concept of operations approval due to different levels of training and coordination.

An example of perfect control afforded by actionable intelligence would be the location of a known terrorist on a kill list with an available drone overhead and a missile could launched within minutes of identification and approval. This option is

completely controlled by the U.S. Control is present because aviation assets used in the strike are directed by the U.S. and respond quickly to decisions made to employ the mechanism.

Quality can diminish as control diminishes. During an "enabled-plus" mission, defined as U.S. military advisors accompanying a foreign special operations unit on a targeted strike against a terrorist camp, control diminishes with the introduction of the partner. The quality of this option is subject to two factors: skill level of the foreign unit (likelihood of success) and control. U.S. advisors exerting influence vis-à-vis the foreign unit's command structure can overcome control.

There is a trade-off that exists between high quality, high risk and low quality, low risk. Discussion of option quality also involves a discussion of risk. The trade-off is not science, but more of an art. Unfortunately, estimates must be made and parity is not always clear. Although military options have been used as the example, option quality assessment is not limited to military options.

When we examined the value proposition presented by SOF, we discovered that options should appear as likely to succeed, responsive, vetted, and in consideration of the connectedness of our partners. We have provided examples and examined how each criterion creates value in the customer level. In order to evaluate and compare options, it is important for customers to have an understanding of the criteria that each option possesses.

C. INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE

The internal perspective seeks to create value for customers by aligning activities and processes in such a way that the options it produces meet the four criteria of quality found in the customer level. Our model links measurable activities to this creation of value. Members of the GSN that operate in these activities and conduct these processes must consider the end product of options as they conduct operations, access and share intelligence, establish relationships and communicate with partners, and manage resources. Consideration of the end product of options can yield better management of choices at lower levels.

Figure 6 depicts the level of the model that traces and links the activities of the internal perspective with quality criteria found in the value proposition. As explained in this section, we conceptualize these links between activities and processes and criteria with blue lines. The thicker this blue line, the greater the impact that the activity or process has on the criterion it is connected to. As shown in our model, the answer to the question "At what activities and processes must the network excel?" is "Those activities and processes that are directly linked to criterion the network customer demands." To create value, the activities and process must positively affect these criteria.



Figure 6. The Internal Perspective

1. Internal to Who?

The activities and processes found on the strategy map are internal to a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF). JSOTFs are temporary joint commands consisting mostly of special operations forces. The JSOTF is typically established to accomplish a specific mission or to control SOF in a specific theater of operations. JSOTFs are comprised of all services and have established relationships with inter-agency partners. A JSOTF reports to the GCC via the TSOC but operates in close conjunction with the country team from the U.S. Department of State.

2. The Objectives and Initiatives of the Internal Perspective

The objectives found in the internal perspective on our strategy map represent the specifics a deployed task force must do well in order to maximize their output of high quality options in execution of ADM McRaven's strategy to "Expand the GSN" (Niven, 2003). Each objective is allocated to an initiative. Initiatives represent specific programs, functions, or activities deployed task forces will focus on in order to meet performance expectations (Niven, 2003). On our strategy map, a cluster of rectangles represents objectives; an oval represents an initiative. We will discuss each objective, respective initiative, and link to the value proposition in the following sections.

3. The Operations Management Initiative

The operations initiative is an essential activity of a deployed task force, responsible for daily and future operations. Commonly referred to as the J3, or just OPS, this activity approves coordinates and reports on: enabled plus operations (the partnered-military option) and partner engagement operations. This part of a task force is heavily connected with all elements of the task force and can generate influence through communication and direction. We recommend that the operations initiative of the Internal Perspective strive to achieve the following objectives because they are directly related to criteria found in the value proposition.

> Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the potential to create animosity due to unmet expectations.
>
> ADM McRaven (Posture Statement of Admiral William H. McRaven, 2013)

a. Coordinating Engagement Objective

Engagement describes any interaction between any member of a task force and influential elements of foreign militaries, socio-political and economic systems, or inter-agency partners. Engagements can be office calls, military training, intelligence exchanges, or coordination and execution of operations. Conducting engagement requires resources and approval; both are influenced and controlled by the operations initiative.

An example of engagement is a series of meetings between a task force commander and his foreign military counterpart, an officer of similar rank. At the meetings, they discuss the local security situation and capabilities gaps. The meetings build trust and familiarity between the two commanders. A significant aspect of the series of meetings is the periodicity in which they take place. Are they regular? Are they episodic? What level of periodicity is required by the partner's culture and security environment? Combined, the terms coordination and engagement should represent a plan of action to expand U.S. influence on, and access to, the mechanisms that represent options in an efficient way and with understanding of certain intangible aspects of the partnership.

(1) Link to Likelihood of Success and Responsiveness. The coordinated engagement objective is linked to both the responsiveness and likelihood of success criterion through the increased trust and understanding of partners that working towards this objective creates. Trust can improve responsiveness by decreasing the time a partner's chain of command takes to approve a partnered-military option. The decreased time it takes for a partner assault force to approve an operation improves the responsiveness of an option. An improved understanding of a partner's capabilities and limitations is linked to the likelihood of success by increasing the chances the U.S. task force will choose the correct partner for a specific operation.

(2) Link to Diversity. Uniquely, the coordinated engagement objective is linked strongly to the diversity of options in the decision maker's perspective. Engagement coordination should seek to balance the attention spent on existing relevant options. The desired outcome of a successful engagement plan is a posture that provides timely access to a diversified set of high quality options designed to counter the most dangerous and most likely threats, while capitalizing on the most beneficial opportunities. Balance in this process will support diversity in the options presented to decision makers by avoiding an over emphasis on a specific type of option or a specific partner. A coordinated engagement process will also align JSOTF activities with U.S. foreign policy objectives set by the Department of State (United States Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2010).

In order to conduct engagement, units in the JSOTF require resources and approvals, both managed by the J3 component of a JSOTF. It is through resource allocation and approving concept of operations that the operations department can manage the engagement process. Expanding influence, gaining access, and improving options all can be partly achieved through management of resources and approvals. The application of these resources and approvals should be based on the anticipated effect on option criteria. It is important to note that the execution of these processes will occur in a contested environment; they must be performed more efficiently and effectively than those of our adversaries. We must excel at these processes to maximize the quality and availability of options.

b. Evaluate Partner's Objective

A partner force evaluations (PFE) documents holistic appraisals of a partner on a myriad of tangible and intangible aspects such as capacity to contribute-to-operations, willingness to conduct operations, and socio-political ties. These documents represent the value partners bring to the network. The evaluation serves as an assessment of the usefulness and capacity of this specific addition to the network. Information contained in PFEs is required and maintained by the operations initiative.

Consider a hypothetical example of a coastal African region where political sensitivities preclude the permanent pre-positioning of American fast boat assets; in fact, the respective chiefs of mission have requested only a small footprint of U.S. SOF advisors in each country with no permanent presence. If maritime interdiction operations are likely, the respective partners should be assessed on their capacity to contribute to the partnered option with access to boats. The partner force evaluation would assess each country's maritime assets based on physical attributes such as speed, good working order, crew training, or access to fuel. Collectively, these measurements represent each country's capacity to contribute to the partnered-military, maritime interdiction option.

(1) Link to Likelihood of Success and Responsiveness. By the increased understanding of partner capabilities that the PFE creates, the evaluated

partner's objective is strongly linked to the likelihood of success and responsiveness of options. PFEs assess partner force skill level, providing insights on the likelihood of an option's success involving this partner. By providing an assessment of their capacity to contribute to operations, understanding a partner's capability speeds operational planning and, thus, the responsiveness of the partnered option.

Understanding the limitations of a partner can drive security force assistance towards improving the speed of a partner's tactical assets such as boats, helicopters, and trucks. The PFE should provide a basis to make decisions regarding performance changes in partnered options as a result of investment of resources and effort. Prior to measuring change, a basis must be established; the partner force evaluation is that basis.

(2) Link to Connectivity. The evaluated partner's objective can link to the connectivity criterion through an assessment of a partner's access, willingness-to-act, and cultural links. PFEs encourage the dissemination of vital information regarding partners. This documentation ensures understanding of a partner's socio-political affiliations is transferred to future units supporting task forces that operate with the partner.

Excellence at the process of managing the information contained in the evaluations will be as important as conducting accurate assessments. In order for this internal process to successfully influence the option criteria, access to information regarding partner capacity, willingness, and socio-political ties should be made readily available to units preparing to conduct operations with the partner.

The information contained in the evaluations will enhance resource allocations' suggestions made by task forces. The complicated part for an operations department is that the evaluations will not be standardized in form, but rather unique to AOs, unique to partner forces, and unique to enemy threats. Access and currency of PF evaluations will be vital to creating positive impact to this option's criteria.

4. The Intelligence Initiative

The intelligence initiative is an essential activity of a deployed task force, responsible for providing intelligence support. Commonly referred to as the J2, or just INTEL, this activity is responsible for generating, accessing, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence for U.S. units and their respective partners. The intelligence initiative is heavily connected to the J3 and command element. It drives operations that are conducted and influences decision-making. We recommend that the intelligence initiative of the internal perspective strive to achieve the following objectives because they are directly related to criteria found in the value proposition.

a. Share Information Objective

Sharing information transfers data, ideas, concepts, and intelligence to elements of foreign militaries, socio-political and economic systems, or inter-agency partners to assist their decision-making or improve their effectiveness. Examples of information shared include geo-spatial imagery, open-source Twitter-sentiment analysis, or consolidated demographic data. Any member of a task force can share information.

The sharing of pertinent information in the GSN involves a process relationship of: awareness of available information, technology access, and partnership. Often, U.S. personnel supporting the GSN will have better awareness and better technology than many partner nations, especially in the developing world. In order to share information effectively, task forces require personnel with the awareness of information, the technology to access it, and contact with a partner that can use it.

(1) Link to Likelihood of Success and Responsiveness. The share information objective is strongly linked to both the likelihood of success and responsiveness criteria because this objective improves the accuracy and timeliness of information driving partnered and non-attributable operations. Shared information can improve the accuracy of a targeted military assault or improve the likelihood that the right segment of a population understands a strategic message delivered by an information option. Mastering information sharing can create elements of trust and credibility between those supplying the information and those taking action based on it.

In the GSN, U.S. personnel supply information to partners so they can take action. Trust and credibility can influence a partner's "willingness to act" and, thus, improve the responsiveness of a partnered option. Sharing information that the U.S. has better access to, can improve the overall quality of an option.

Sharing relevant and timely information will improve the overall quality of options created by the GSN. Mastering this process will require education of personnel operating within the GSN. Educating personnel that interact with partners on the available types of information and methods of presentation enhances awareness and utility. Procurement of technology that generates or accesses information and links that technology with personnel who interact with partners will be important in achieving this objective.

b. Use Reachback Objective

Reachback's description: the consumption of information products created in a separate physical location for use by a task force unable to create the information product. An example of information accessed through reachback would be in-depth analysis conducted by experienced analysts regarding the pattern of the life of a known terrorist. The information product is beyond the scope or capability of the task force, however, greatly improves the credibility of the information the task force is sharing with its partners.

Reachback capability focuses on the second part of information sharing: Accessing through technology, a person or machine that can generate the information. Simply knowing who in the network can provide the available information is not enough. Task forces must have the technology to request and receive information products so they can share them with partners.

(1) Link to Likelihood of Success. Effectively using reachback is linked to the likelihood of success of options because the objective improves the accuracy of information driving partnered and non-attributable operations. Facilities providing the information have a greater capacity to produce more powerful analysis than

small footprint, distributed task force operators. Accessing and ultimately sharing the information through the reachback process can improve the likelihood of success of partnered and non-attributable options.

5. The Communications Initiative

The communications initiative is an essential function that deployed task forces perform: daily communication through both words and actions to partners, enemies, and neutral parties. Involving aspects of strategic messaging and inter-personal relationships, this function is responsible for influencing the narrative that defines U.S. forces and their partners abroad and for expanding capability and influence through individual relationships. Uniquely, this initiative is not isolated to any department or program of a task force, but rather open to all personnel that have interaction with outsiders of the task force. We recommend that the communications initiative of the Internal Perspective strive to achieve the following objectives because they are directly related to criteria found in the value proposition.

a. Make Relationships Objective

Making personal relationships with elements of foreign militaries, socio-political and economic systems, and inter-agency partners creates the structure of the network that transmits and receives messages, shares information, and generates influence. Relationships can be personal, professional, clandestine, or other. Relationships represent the links of the network and are vital to its success. Any member of a task force can create and maintain a relationship.

(1) Link to the Value Proposition. Relationships are the bedrock of networks and provide for the transfer and communication of information between the U.S. and its partners. All criteria have an aspect of relationship to them. Assessments of the likelihood of success, responsiveness, connectivity, or human rights track record of a partner is unattainable if a relationship with the partner does not allow U.S. personnel to meet with and assess the partner's capability.

We ascertain that any member of a task force can create, maintain or destroy relationships. The stronger personal relationships are with influential people

in a foreign country, the greater the amount of influence can be exercised on the decision-making cycle of the partner. Effort must be made in choosing the right partners with which to establish relationships. This enhances the matching of partners to threats they are willing to act against and enhances the delivery and acceptance of strategic communications at any level. Both the knowledge of a partner's connections and the development of personal relationships take time, effort, and resources to maintain.

We suggest that task force members excel at two major aspects of personal relationships, establishment and maintenance. The establishing aspect of personal relationships is important, as they must know who the most lucrative partners are. The maintaining aspect is important especially to military members as we have cyclical deployments, making re-establishment and handoffs key. Keeping open lines of communications with partners is crucial. Members should evaluate the importance of both foreign and U.S., and apply resources to the establishment and maintenance appropriately.

b. Effectively Message

The objective to effective messaging is strongly linked to the likelihood of success for information options by seeking mechanisms that maximize the amount of people it can communicate to with. Understanding the amount of people a specific mechanism can reach increases the likelihood that an information option will succeed at effectively messaging.

An example of an effective message is a radio broadcast that influences a decisive narrative in a positive way for the U.S. or a partner. In this example, a task force wishes to deliver a message to the population of a city that has 100,000 people. The task force currently has an information option that uses newsprint as the primary mechanism for delivery and estimates the reach of this message to be 10,000 readers. Demographic information for the city says that 90 percent of the population is illiterate, but they have radios. In this example, radio is a more effective means with which to communicate than newsprint. The task force should seek to develop an information option that uses radio as

its primary means of delivery. Consequently, the task force should seek to establish relationships with people or groups that have access to local radio in order to advance towards the effectively message objective.

(1) Link to Likelihood of Success. Messaging effectively is linked to likelihood of success of options because the objective increases the amount of people that can potentially receive a message. Just as advertisers pay a premium for commercial time during the Super Bowl because of the quantity of people watching, task forces should seek mechanisms that can potentially reach the most people. Seeking mechanisms that can deliver the greatest audience reach can improve the likelihood of success of information options.

(2) Link to Connectivity. Effective messaging is linked to connectivity because the effects of messaging can shape a partner's connectedness with their environment. An effective messaging campaign can bring a partner closer to the population by illustrating the ability of the partner to provide effective security. If closeness is achieved, this can serve to isolate an enemy from the population, serving U.S. interests. Using messaging campaigns to improve a partner's image with their population increases the understanding of the partner's connectedness.

Effective messaging can have significant impacts on the option criteria. Effects of messaging can be improved by leveraging the reach associated with mechanisms that deliver messages. We recommend that task forces seek mechanisms with the greatest reach in order to maximize the effect of their messaging.

6. The Security Force Assistance Initiative

The Security Force Assistance (SFA) initiative is an important program where deployed task forces have an instrumental role in suggesting and sometimes providing material support to partners. Several elements of the task for ce have an impact on SFA to include the J3, command element, and operational units. We identify that the objectives of the security force assistance program should be to enhance the capability of partners and to increase the influence of the U.S. in support of the option criteria found in the value proposition.

a. Enhance Partner's Objective

Enhancing partners refers to activities that improve a partner's ability to conduct successful operations. Activities can be combined training or equipment purchases. An example of improving a partner's capacity for operations is the use of funds authorized by section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act to purchase a mobility asset such as trucks. Before 1206 was used, a partner assault team traveled to a target in a slow, old, unreliable transport truck that travels 10 miles per hour, carries only 10 assaulters, and breaks down four times out of 10. The U.S. uses 1206 funds to purchase 14 brand-new four-wheel drive pickup trucks. The new trucks travel 45 miles per hour, carry 56 assaulters, and have predictable reliability. The new trucks represent an enhancement of the partner's capability to conduct operations.

(1) Link to Likelihood of Success, Responsiveness, and Vetted. The enhance partner's objective is strongly linked to both the likelihood of success and responsiveness criterion. This is because achieving this objective can improve the skill level of a partner unit or the ability for the partner to contribute to operations with physical assets such as boats, trucks, and helicopters. Enhancement of partners is difficult if Congress does not approve of partnership with an un-vetted unit. Improved skill level and better assets can lead to a higher likelihood of success and responsiveness for partnered and non-attributable options.

Excellence in the internal process can be logically linked to each option criteria. Excellence in partner force evaluations and resource access promotes effective planning for the application of available resources to improve an option's quality and responsiveness through training and equipment acquisitions. A coordinated engagement process can improve personal relationships that, in turn, promote trust enhancing a partner's willingness to act. Sharing accurate, relevant and timely information promotes trust and improves the likelihood a partner will experience success when taking action. Reachback capability improves the quality and responsiveness as greater access to deeper intelligence analysis links time sensitive intelligence to the forces that can take action.

Collectively, the activities and processes should represent the focus of day-to-day operations for deployed task forces. Excellence at these processes will maximize the capacity of the JSOTFs to produce options that create value for the customer level. The relation to the option criteria shows how everyday activities can have an impact on the overall output of an organization.

D. LEARNING AND GROWTH PERSPECTIVE

The learning and growth perspective seeks to prepare the enterprise for deployment to task forces supporting the GSN by aligning their training with activities that are conducted on deployment. These activities directly affect the four criteria of quality found in the customer level. Our model links training with initiatives and objectives in the internal perspective. Personnel preparing to operate in these initiatives and towards these objectives must consider the end product of options as they conduct operations, access and share intelligence, establish relationships and communicate with partners, and manage resources. Consideration of the end product of options can yield better management of choices at lower levels.

Figure 7, The Learning and Growth Perspective, depicts the level of the model that trains personnel preparing to deploy to task forces. Also in this level, formal partnerships are established through diplomatic channels. As explained in this section, we conceptualize the links between training, formal partnerships, and the initiatives and objectives of the internal perspective. As shown in our model, the answer to the question "What should be done before deployment?" is "Training and formal partnerships that best support the initiatives and objectives in the internal perspective." To create value, the training and formal partnerships must positively affect these criteria.



Figure 7. The Learning and Growth Perspective

1. Who is in this Row?

The learning and growth perspective considers units before they fall under the operational control of GCCs and become part of JSOTFs. The unit commanders have a primary mission focus to man, train, and equip these forces in preparation for deployment. These unit commanders have much say in how a unit organizes, what assets a unit acquires, and what types of training activities are done prior to deployment. The primary input of training translates into skills used on deployment. Focusing training on skills that support the creation of options will posture forces deploying to JSOTFs well.

a. Human Capital

Human capital is described as the organizational value created by the capabilities, skills, and relationships of the employees (Niven, 2003). In SOF, it represents the partnerships, the experience, and knowledge of permanent and temporary members of the enterprise as they relate to the objectives found in the Internal Perspective.

b. Training

Training focused on resource access, intelligence, and communication will provide the most return in options. Resource access training should focus on the knowledge of existing resource systems and how these resources can improve a partner's option criteria. Intelligence training should focus on friendly intelligence capabilities and the authorities that govern sharing the products of friendly intelligence units with partners. Communication training should focus on interpersonal communication soft skills such as networking, negotiations, and language proficiency.

c. Formal Partnerships

Formal partnership at USSOCOM headquarters in Tampa, Florida takes shape in the form of liaison officers from foreign countries participating in training, information sharing, and coordination. Formal partnerships fostered through collective

security agreements provide a framework of relationships from which to create options. This resource can be used as a stepping-stone to create options.

d. Infrastructure

Task forces require an asset-based global infrastructure to conduct operations. Assets include communication networks that connect the small footprint, distributed operations that SOF conducts. Assets include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft and the operators who run the systems. Physical structures and real estate billet task forces, and providing secure training environments are also part of this asset-based global infrastructure. These assets are acquired through appropriations authorized by the U.S. Congress, a key decision maker found on the strategy map.

Activities conducted prior to deployment can prepare personnel to excel at the initiatives and objectives of the internal perspective. Excellence at these initiatives and objectives will create options that meet criteria found in the value proposition. Customers will recognize the value in these options and recommend these options and courses of action to decision makers. In turn, decision makers happy with diverse sets of options presented to them by SOF will continue to fund training, infrastructure, and formal partnership programs requested by USSOCOM. The cycle continues, increasing the effectiveness of the network and degrading the freedom of maneuver of terrorism.

V. BALANCED SCORECARD

Using the framework from the strategy map in the previous chapter, this chapter will describe the BSC in the context of achieving the GSN's strategic objective. The BSC illustrated in Figure 8 resembles the traditional Scorecard except it is working towards options created rather than financial outcomes that typically are the goal of corporate scorecards. The BSC provides the ability to measure performance by establishing objectives and measures that are weighted based on the importance of the GSN's specific area requirements. The weights are heavier at the lower levels because the objectives of the internal and learning and growth perspective are directly influenced by SOF personnel activities. The decision maker and customer level are weighted less but still require all activities to consider the impact at every level.

Each region that is established by USSOCOM, "the TSOCs," can tailor the BSC to align the BSC with the GCCs specific strategy. The scorecard establishes specific AOR objectives that link performance to strategy, and then uses measures to gauge performance. Additionally, the scorecard ensures a proper feedback loop is in place to help leadership assess and reassess progress.

The BSC for this project has four operational perspectives (decision maker, customer, internal, and learning and growth) that are assessed with specific objectives and measures to support the strategy map. Each measurement is given a weight based on strategic importance, then aggregated to create a cumulative score of 100 percent. Analyzing each measurement, the score can be broken down to identify strengths and weaknesses of a team. In Figure 8, the weight assigned percentage may be adjusted based on the GCC's guidance. A breakdown of the BSC from each perspective will be described in this chapter from the highest-level decision maker to the lowest level unit commander.



BSC for the Global SOF Network

Organizational level	Initiatives	Objectives / Process	Measures		Scoring method	Actual score	Target	% of Target	Weight assigned	Weighted score
Decision-Maker Perspective			1. Existence of: (more is a better score)							
National Security Council, Chief of Mission		Diversity	A. Unilateral Information Option	D. Unilateral Military Option						
			B.Partnered Information Option	E.Partnered Military Option	1-6	3	6	50%	2.0%	1.0%
			C. Non-attrib Information Option	F. Non-attrib Military Option						
		Connectivity	1.Partner Importance		1-100	90	85	106%	3.0%	3.2%
Customer Perspective		Liklihood of success	2 Mission success rates		%		90	0%	3.0%	0.0%
Geographic Combatant Commander, Theatre		Responsiveness	3. Time between decision to employ option and the result of	0 - 1 hour = 3 1 - 24 hours = 2 24 + hours = 1	Time	2	2.5	80%	3.0%	2.4%
		Vetted	4. vetted units (Leahy Law)		Yes/No	0	1	0%	3.0%	0.0%
	Operations Management	Evaluate Partners	1. Availability to functional units		%	78	80	98%	6.0%	5.9%
			2. % of partners evaluated		%	95	90	106%	6.0%	6.3%
Internal Perspective			3. Evaluation currency	0 - 6 months = 3 7-12 montths = 2 12+ months = 1	Time	1	1	100%	6.0%	6.0%
Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander, Joint Task Force Commander		Coordinate Engagement	4. Time between engagements	0 - 90 Days = 3 91-180 Days = 2 181 + Days = 1	Time	1	1	100%	6.0%	6.0%
	Intelligence	Share Information	5. Information consumed that is shared		%	75	90	83%	6.0%	5.0%
		Use Reach back	6. Bandwidth	T-3 = 3 Ethernet = 2 T-1 = 1	Through put	48	80	60%	6.0%	3.6%
	Communication	Make Relationships	7. Interactions - Physical, Voice, Data (# of contacts)		#	49	50	98%	6.0%	5.9%
		Effectively Message	8. Media Reach - percent of		#	80	80	100%	6.0%	6.0%
	Security Force Assessment	Enhance Partners	9. % of request fulfilled		%	78	90	87%	6.0%	5.2%
Learning and Growth (Man, Train & Equip Perspective)	Training	Knowledge of resource systems	1. Functional level knowledge of resource authorities (1206, CMO, M2M) - subjective		%	95	90	106%	8.0%	8.4%
		Knowledge of Intelligence capabilities	2. % of force trained on intelligence sharing		%	90	90	100%	8.0%	8.0%
Functional Unit Commanding Officer's View		Communication Soft Skills	3. Language proficiency		%	100	95	105%	8.0%	8.4%
			4. % of force trained on negotiation skills		%	100	95	105%	8.0%	8.4%
						Total			100.0%	90%

Figure 8. Sample Balanced Scorecard (NOTE: Numbers in this BSC Are for Example Purposes Only)

A. DECISION-MAKER PERSPECTIVE

The first perspective shown in Exhibit 2 is the decision maker perspective; all BSC objectives and performance measures exist to support this objective. This level replaces the financial level of the traditional BSC category used by many private sector companies. The decision-maker perspective is viewed from the nation's civilian leadership such as the National Security Council, Congress and CoM. This is the top row of the BSC; these individuals have overall decision authority, choosing from the options created at the subordinate level. It is at this level that the activities of all subordinate levels (when meeting objectives) inherently create a diverse array of options that decisions makers choose from to achieve informational and military objectives in the nation's interests.

a. Diversity

The diversity created by the multiple choices prevents decision makers from being pigeonholed into an option that costs more in diplomatic capital than the target is worth or not taking action because no appropriate option exists. Decision makers use their situational knowledge to choose the most appropriate option based on external factors such as diplomatic environment or value of the target. Due to the time sensitivity of some choices, providing a simple view of the score and choices available allows for decisions makers to act quickly.

(1) Existence. Existence of more than one option creates choice; a critical requirement when seeking policy strategy matches as stated in the strategy map chapter. Therefore, producing more options will result in a better overall score as it represents diversity in choices. From the decision maker perspective, the goal of option diversity is established through six metrics (unilateral information option, partnered information option, non-attributable information option, unilateral military option, partnered military option, and non-attributable military option). These metrics capture the level of partnership between our allies across the military and information spectrum.

Ultimately, the BSC will show how many options decision makers can choose from during times of crisis or opportunity. We demonstrated earlier that decision makers value this choice when seeking optimal policy-strategy matches.

The percent-of-target column on the BSC, can represent success in creating diverse choices based on a target. Alternatively, they may compare the columns, actual weight and weight assigned, to determine performance relative to target.

Organizational level		Initiatives	Objectives / Process	Measures		Scoring method	Actual score	Target	% of Target	Weight assigned	Weighted score
Decision-Maker Perspective				1. Existence of: (more is a better score)							
National Security Council, Chief of Mission			Diversity	A. Unilateral Information Option	D. Unilateral Military Option						
				B.Partnered Information Option	E.Partnered Military Option	1-6	3	6	50%	2.0%	1.0%
				C. Non-attrib Information Option	F. Non-attrib Military Option						

Figure 9. Decision Maker Perspective

As an example, consider the hypothetical chance opportunity of intelligence providing the exact location of a terrorist training camp in the West African country of Mali. In the neighboring country of Burkina Faso, a special operations task force has been actively conducting operations for approximately 12 months prior to this time sensitive intelligence event. The task force, through its daily activities, has created three options with which it can capitalize on this type of new information. The options the task force has created are unilateral military strike, partnered military strike or non-attributable military strike. Thus, this task force has created three options, or courses of action out of a possible six. All three options are military in nature and the task force is currently deficient on an information option. Pending the decision makers' preferences in this particular situation, they could be either well diversified or un-diversified. If decision makers want a military strike, then this task force appears diversified. If they have preference for an information option, then this task force appears non-diverse.

The NSC and CoM make difficult policy decisions in the complex global environment, choice among options greatly enables these decisions. Subordinate task forces should have a goal of option diversity in mind as they conduct the activities that create options. The BSC provides a snapshot to the decision makers and a target for task forces. Having simple metrics to quickly apply towards the information known at the highest level allows for quick, decisive decisions to be made.

B. CUSTOMER PERSPECTIVE

The second perspective shown in Figure 10 is the customer perspective; the criteria found here represent the objectives for specific options created by task forces. The customer perspective drives activity to provide options that meet "criteria" important to GCC and TSOC commanders. The customer perspective is the link between deployed task forces and the NSC and CoM leadership. The criteria that govern the production of options are connectivity, likelihood of success, responsiveness, and vetted.

			Connectivity	1.Partner Importance		1-100	90	85	106%	3.0%	3.2%
Customer Perspective			Liklihood of success	2 Mission success rates		%		90	0%	3.0%	0.0%
Geographic Combatant Commander, Theatre			Responsiveness	3. Time between decision to employ option and the result of	0 - 1 hour = 3 1 - 24 hours = 2 24 + hours = 1	Time	2	2.5	80%	3.0%	2.4%
			Vetted	4. vetted units (Leahy Law)		Yes/No	0	1	0%	3.0%	0.0%

Figure 10. Customer Perspective

1. Option Criteria/Value Proposition

The four option criteria make up the value proposition. The value proposition represents how SOF returns values to decision makers. The four criteria are connectivity, Likelihood of success, responsiveness and vetted. Each contributes to the decision maker's perception of overall option quality. Task forces strive to ensure their options meet these criteria.

a. Connectivity

The connectivity measurement is an assessment measuring the partner's connections to the socio-political environment surrounding an enemy; this assessment can serve as a proxy for a partner's support to U.S. strategic objectives. This score (numeric 1-100) is based on the partner's sensitivity to a crisis or target, and requires input from subject matter experts (SME). There can be both political and religious dimensions to determining the connectivity of a partner.

For example, assume a partner force shares the same religion with the enemy; in other words, is highly connected with the enemy. Thus, their support to U.S. strategic objectives is questionable. Conversely, operating with a partner force with little ties to a target might increase their likelihood to support U.S. strategic objectives. Understanding how a partner is connected to a crisis allows an SME to determine how connectivity will affect the outcome of a potential operation. When determining a score, the SME considers a partner's relationship to potential enemies. Higher scores translate to greater socio-political ties to an environment surrounding a target.

b. Likelihood of Success:

The likelihood of success measurement is an assessment predicting the option's chances against probable enemies. Scores (a percentage) are determined by SME's and represent the option's chances for attaining the objective it is designed to attain. There are many facets to this assessment and its weakness is that it represents an opinion.

As an example, consider the evaluation of two military options. Assume U.S. forces comprise a 10 assaulter, unilateral military option. The option intends to raid an enemy camp with 40 enemy combatants. This unilateral military option has a low score on likely to succeed due to low numbers. As an alternative option, a partnered military option represents 10 U.S. personnel and 60 partner force troops. This option has a higher score due to the sheer size of the friendly assault force compared to the enemy. The SME provides an opinion as to the likelihood of success of these two options against probable enemies. If creating and maintaining the unilateral option is an imperative, the deployed task force should seek to increase the number of assaulters it can quickly assemble into a unilateral option. This can be achieved by increasing training of available U.S. assaulters, requesting more assaulters, or improving the means with which assaulters from another task force linkup to create a larger force.

c. Responsiveness

Responsiveness measurement is the time between making the decision to execute an option and executing it. Using a scale of one through three, scores response times are as follows:

- Score 3 = 0-1 hour
- Score 2 = 1–24 hours
- Score 1 = 24 + hours

The score for this measurement will be aggregated into the overall score. A default of 2 is set for a target score. However, depending on the time sensitivity of a crisis the score may move up or down.

For example, assume a decision maker approves an (M,U) drone strike on a specific target. The elapsed time from making a decision to destroying the target in 15 minutes renders a score of three. Conversely, assume the decision has been made to inform a local village through (I,P) media that a terrorist cell has kidnapped coalition forces. Rescuing the prisoners must be approved through the partner force that has three levels of approval authority. One day is required for each level of authority. This option

would render a score of one (1), putting the hostages at risk. When a scorecard metric is low in one category, the GCC may apply other initiatives (such as connectivity) to solve the problem

d. Vetted

Vetted partners measurement is an assessment of determining whether or not the U.S. can train, operate, and share information with a specific country. Chapter IV mentioned the Leahy law, which prevents U.S. assistance and involvement with militaries associated with human rights violations. This measure is scored (yes = 1 or no = 0) based on meeting the criteria of the Leahy law. It is important that the U.S. continue to set the example around the world that it will not support any country that commits human rights crimes. As an example of how a score could be calculated, assume a country that is committing genocide on its own citizens but is very strategically located is asking for U.S. support. This country would assist in conducting operations in information warfare against a neighboring country. Even if the U.S. could gain influence in the region by deterring a neighboring country, the U.S. is unable to vet and work the country that is committing genocide.

The customer perspective motivates behavior that provides options meeting "criteria" important to the GCC and TSOC commander. This perspective requires knowledgeable, competent SME's to ensure accurate information meets the strategy and is being reported to the next level. All the information that reaches the customer is based on the activities motivated by the internal perspective.

C. INTERNAL PERSPECTIVE

You can't surge trust.

(United States Special Operations Command, 2013)

The third perspective shown in Figure 11 is the internal perspective; this perspective supports the customer perspective by aligning initiative specific objectives

towards option criteria. It seeks to answer the question, “At what activities and processes must we excel?” In answering this question, the initiatives and objectives become apparent.

The internal perspective includes the JSOTF and the JTF, organizations ultimately responsible for the creation of options. Success is determined by positive performance of the activities that support the customer level. This level has four Initiatives (operations management, intelligence, communications, and resource access) and seven objectives (partner force evaluations, coordinated engagements, information sharing, reach-back capability, delivering strategic communications, ability to enhance partner capability and ability to increase influence). The measures are weighted more heavily in this section of the scorecard because the activities are core to the operational units.

		Operations Management	Evaluate Partners	1. Availability to functional units		%	78	80	98%	6.0%	5.9%
				2. % of partners evaluated		%	95	90	106%	6.0%	6.3%
Internal Perspective				3. Evaluation currency	0 - 6 months = 3 7-12 montths = 2 12+ months = 1	Time	1	1	100%	6.0%	6.0%
Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander, Joint Task Force Commander			Coordinate Engagement	4. Time between engagements	0 - 90 Days = 3 91-180 Days = 2 181 + Days = 1	Time	1	1	100%	6.0%	6.0%
		Intelligence	Share Information	5. Information consumed that is shared		%	75	90	83%	6.0%	5.0%
			Use Reach back	6. Bandwidth	T-3 = 3 Ethernet = 2 T-1 = 1	Through put	48	80	60%	6.0%	3.6%
		Communication	Make Relationships	7. Interactions - Physical, Voice, Data (# of contacts)		#	49	50	98%	6.0%	5.9%
			Effectively Message	8. Media Reach - percent of		#	80	80	100%	6.0%	6.0%
		Security Force Assessment	Enhance Partners	9. % of request fulfilled		%	78	90	87%	6.0%	5.2%

Figure 11. Internal Perspective

1. Initiative: Operations Management

Operations management has two objectives linked to it, partner force evaluation and coordinated engagements. These objectives are designed to determine the operational readiness and potential support of vetted partners.

a. Evaluate Partners

The objective of partner force evaluations in this chapter is divided into three measurement criteria: availability to functional units, percent of partners evaluated, and evaluation currency that determine the strength of the relationship. Partner force evaluations are designed to measure the overall value of a relationship between partners. They also determine a partner's capacity and willingness to act to achieve U.S. interests. Management of the information contained in PFEs is as important as the accuracy of the PFE itself.

(1) Availability to Functional Units. The availability to functional units directly affects the likelihood of success and drives the ability to deal with a crisis through a partnered arrangement, rather than unilaterally. This score (a percentage), measures the amount of task force troops that have received training on a partner force evaluation system. The system provides access to the partner force evaluations conducted by SMEs.

(2) Percent of Partners Evaluated. The percent of partners that have been evaluated determines how engaged U.S. forces are within an AO. Scoring of partners for scorecard purposes involves simply counting the number of vetted partners within the AO and reviewing documentation to see if they have been evaluated in the last year. The periodicity varies depending on the availability and competency of each individual partner. As the U.S. continues to develop relationships, the number of vetted partners and periodic evaluations will increase. Conducting a data search how many countries has been evaluated is only one facet of analyzing partners. Identifying the last time they were evaluated also plays a role in the likelihood of success.

(3) Evaluation Currency. Currency is a critical aspect of partner evaluations because task forces require information relevant to the choices they

make regarding partnership. This measurement makes an assumption that the older an evaluation is, the less relevant the information contained becomes. Currency is measured on a scale of one to three.

- Score 3 = 0-6 months
- Score 2 = 7–12 months
- Score 1 = 12 + months

The score for this measurement will be aggregated into the overall score. A default of 2 is set for a target score. Situational dependent and pending commander preferences, the target score may be higher or lower. A situation where the target score would be set lower is an established partner who has fairly consistent training and access to resources. USSOF evaluation of this partner can afford to have a longer time in between updates.

b. Coordinate engagements

Engagement coordination should seek to balance the attention spent on existing relevant options because it separates episodic training from an enduring relationship. Time between engagements is the measurement used to determine the impact of coordinated engagements.

(1) Time between Engagements. Time between engagements affects the competency and capability of a partner. This measurement assumes shorter time between engagements strengthens the overall relationship. Time between engagements is measured on a scale of one to three.

- Score 3 = 0-90 days
- Score 2 = 91–180 days
- Score 1 = 181 + days

The score for this measurement will be aggregated into the overall score. A default of 2 is set for a target score. Similar to evaluation currency, coordinated engagements are measured by the elapsed time since the U.S. previously engaged a partner. Having a clear understanding of the partners within the AO, an experienced leader can assess how often the U.S. must be engaging a partner. By way of example, an Afghani army element conducting real world operations will require continuous

engagement to support U.S. policies. Meanwhile, a well-trained British SOF unit will not require the same attention. It is the responsibility of the JSOTF to determine how each partner will be measured and scored based on their experience. Evaluating and engaging with our partners is the core of the GSN. In order for the U.S. to meet its national strategy the operational management initiative is imperative. To ensure operations become enduring we must incorporate the intelligence aspect to the internal perspective.

2. Initiative: Intelligence

Intelligence is what drives operations. By accessing, analyzing and disseminating intelligence, the U.S. and their properly vetted partners collaborate and increase the GSN's capability. Sharing intelligence requires trust and ethical fortitude between all parties with access to information. The intelligence perspective consists of two types of intangible objectives (information sharing and reachback capability) that link partners together.

a. Share Information

This is the dissemination of information, data, concepts, ideas and intelligence among partners. Trust and credibility among those supplying and those receiving the information is the cornerstone for effective use of intelligence. Information sharing includes both U.S. agencies and international partners. This objective is measured by how well information is disseminated across the GSN to increase its effectiveness.

(1) Information Consumed that is Shared. The scorecard measures the proportion of actionable intelligence. The score (a percentage) is determined by an SME's ability to link information gathered to likelihood of success and responsiveness. Linking intelligence to these to objectives drives operations and aids decision makers. In order to share information, the GSN must be able to reachback to resources in the rear (not on the frontlines) to conduct operations.

b. Use Reachback

Reachback capability is the ability for deployed units to have access to people or data that can generate and provide information in a timely manner. Figure 12

shows a field unit requesting information (left arrow). Depending on the how much information is requested, the unit may need to continue to reachback to a robust intelligence center in the U.S. Reachback is measured by the amount of bandwidth available to share information between forward deployed units and units supporting the deployed units.



Figure 12. Example of Reachback Process

c. Bandwidth

Bandwidth is the rate by which information can be shared between partners. This score (a numeric value) is determined using a scale of one through three based on speed that information flows through the network. The values are defined as follows:

- Score 3 = T-3 line (fast)
- Score 2 = Ethernet (average)
- Score 1 = T-1 (slow)

The expected value is 2; however, depending on the importance of information that must be shared the score may adjust up or down. For example, units physically working at a headquarters are going to require a T-3 capability in order to have the capacity to get timely information to outlying locations. Conversely, an outlying unit

that transmits information only to prevent an enemy from using electronic equipment to locate its position requires less bandwidth. Thus, the outlying units in this example would produce a lower score. Bandwidth is crucial for deployed units in remote locations to have the ability to access a GSN to request. However, personally communicating with partners is the best and simplest way to gather intelligence.

3. Initiative: Communications

Physical interactions among partners, perspective partners, and belligerents (along with messages delivered through the media) all impact the likelihood of success and connectivity. Communication creates an enduring GSN that supports the defense strategy to create a global force. Communications consists of two scorecard objectives, personal relationships and strategic communications.

Creating relationships and strategically communicating through the media is related to the aspects of the internal perspective that SOF units use to build and develop the GSN. As partners are won over through effective interaction, the U.S. can increase its support by capitalizing on SFA initiatives to better equip our partners for success.

a. Make Relationships

The objective of personal relationships directly links to the overall value of the GSN. Creating personal relationships coupled with effective communication through media increases the overall U.S. support within an AO. The scorecard measures the success of establishing relationships.

(1) Interactions—Physical, Voice, and Data. Interactions that include physical, voice and data are measured based on the actual number of contacts made. This is scored (numeric 1–100) based on the quality of the personal contacts and the impact of the actual interaction. Contact alone does not determine success. A strong relationship with less contact warrants a higher score than a weak relationship with multiple contacts. This is a subjective score based on individual perceptions; the type of interaction should be factored into the score. The ability to influence a populous through strategic media communication (television, radio, internet, and newspapers) supports the personal relationships that have been fostered.

b. Effectively Message

Delivery of strategic communications to affect the local populous by a unified partner message is designed to sway locals away from the enemy. Strategic communications is measured by analyzing the influence the U.S., or partner, has on the local population.

(1) Media Reach. Media reach is designed to create effective messaging that influences different media sources to impact a village, town, city or country in line with achieving our strategy. This is also scored (numerical 1–100) by an SME who uses the atmospherics of an area to determine the influence a partner or the U.S. has in that area. The simplest example of the impact of media is when a liberated country is waving American flags. Such images create a positive message, thereby deterring the enemy.

4. Initiative: Security Force Assistance

> Arguably the most important military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries.
>
> Hon. Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, 10OCT2007 (Livingston, 2011)

USSOCOM is the joint proponent for SFA within the Defense Department (Livingston, 2011). Security Force Assistance is the direct material and personnel support to foreign militaries to improve their capability for providing security. This has a direct connection with the operations management initiative in regards to evaluating a partner and providing them capability. Providing these types of resources strongly affects the likelihood of success and responsiveness. To measure how effective U.S. applies SFA is achieved by analyzing the percentage of SFA requests such as 1206 that are fulfilled.

a. Enhance Partners

The U.S. can enhance partner capability ranging from providing SFA in USSOF personnel or procuring equipment that increases a partner's stand-alone capability. SFA can be accomplished by providing boats, vehicles, radios, and a myriad of other resources using funds such as 1206 made available through congress.

(1) Percent of SFA Requests Filled. The percent of SFA requests fulfilled gauges how well operational units are supporting partners and expressing the requirement to the CJSOTFC or JTFC. This metric is scored (as a percentage) by the number of SFA requests that have been completely fulfilled. Consider an example of how a request could not be filled. Assume an outgoing unit relinquishes responsibility of a partner to an incoming unit and thereby its pending SFA requests. Communicating the pending requests is imperative to maintaining relationships and maximizing the effectiveness of SFA resources. The GSN's goal is to replace episodic relationships with enduring ones. Proper education on how to use SFA funds such as 1206 increases the likelihood of success of the GSN.

The internal perspective is the level in which the GSN will succeed or fail! The activities conducted at this level shape how the customer will present the options to the decision maker. By measuring the objectives at this level it can be determined how effective partnerships are utilized, how well information is collaborated, and whether resources are being allocated properly. It is through these measurements that the GSN will transition partner relationships from episodic to enduring. As discussed in this perspective, the success of internal activities rely heavily on an SME's ability assess partners, situations, and intangible progress. Gaining the required knowledge and experience requires applicable learning and growth to occur.

D. LEARNING AND GROWTH

Learning and growth is designed to mentally and physically prepare units through manning, training, and equipping units prior to deploying overseas. The commanding officer (CO) has tremendous influence over the troops under his or her command. Strong leadership promoting the SOF ethos will develop into enhanced productivity, dedication, professionalism, and commitment. It is responsibility of the CO to instill an organizational culture of respect and trust. The learning and growth perspective of the BSC is specifically structured to capture this aspect and convey it throughout the entire unit down to the most junior person. Leveraging experience, developmental goals, and advanced qualifications increases responsibility, which in turn increases the overall

capability. Both individual and command wide objectives described in this section are critical for applying skills in the internal perspective. The objectives in learning and growth are: Knowledge of resource systems, knowledge of intelligence capabilities, and communication soft skills. Prior to deploying the focus of the unit commanders is to man, train, equip, and assess readiness. Unit commanders focus on preparing for the activities that occur in the internal perspective. Resource access training facilitates the ability to be successful at the internal level.

Learning and Growth (Man, Train & Equip Perspective)		Training	Knowledge of resource systems	1. Functional level knowledge of resource authorities (1206, CMO, M2M) - subjective		%	95	90	106%	8.0%	8.4%
			Knowledge of Intelligence capabilities	2. % of force trained on intelligence sharing		%	90	90	100%	8.0%	8.0%
Functional Unit Commanding Officer's View			Communication Soft Skills	3. Language proficiency		%	100	95	105%	8.0%	8.4%
				4. % of force trained on negotiation skills		%	100	95	105%	8.0%	8.4%

Figure 13. Learning and Growth

1. Initiative: Training

The unit commander's focus is to man, train, equip, forces on resource access, intelligence and communication. Training is broken down into three initiatives (knowledge of resource systems, knowledge of intelligence capabilities, and communication soft skills) that are assessed prior to members deploying overseas.

a. Knowledge of resource systems

A key aspect of success at the internal level is the knowledge of the resources at the disposal of the SOF units and how to access them. This measure is scored (percent of force) by assessing the level of competency of all members' trained prior to deploying. The purpose of the metric is to ensure training of USSOF personnel to have a functional level knowledge of resources available and the authorities on how to implement them to increase their capability while forward deployed. A critical resource for SOF is the 1206 authority, which is designed for security force assistance to foreign partners.

> This statute provides the Secretary of Defense with authority to train and equip foreign military forces and foreign maritime security forces for two specified purposes:
>
> To enable foreign military forces, as well as foreign maritime security forces, to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations. (Nearly all Section 1206 assistance from FY2006 to FY2009 was for CT training and equipment.)
>
> To enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are participating. (Serafino, 2013)

(1) Functional Level Knowledge of Resource Authorities. Receiving training in SFA is the first step in preparing SOF members for dealing with partner development. A coherent understanding of military to military (M2M) and civil military operations (CMO) informs SOF (specifically junior) personnel on how best to interact with both U.S. and foreign military units. The environment of unilateral operations is declining and understanding how working with other military can increase

efficiency, capability and success of operations. Along with having a clear understanding of functional knowledge, learning how intelligence capabilities enhance a unit is important.

b. Knowledge of Intelligence Capabilities

The knowledge of intelligence capabilities objective is a critical part of training because maximizing resources available enhances everyone, not just individual units. Having a clear understanding of the guidance on how information is disseminated among partners is essential for linking information to operations because intelligence drives operations.

(1) Percent of Force Trained on Intelligence Sharing. The scorecard measurement (a percentage) is captured by determining the actual amount of SOF personnel that have received training on intelligence collection and sharing authorities. Proper training will prevent illicit sharing with partners that are not authorized to see certain intelligence, as well as instruct how to share intelligence with authorized partners. The simplest way to share information is through personal interaction, and the best way to do so is to speak the partner's language.

c. Communication Soft Skills

The objective of communication soft skills is to get SOF personnel trained in cultural and language skillsets. The scorecard captures information in two ways: Language proficiency and percent of force that has participated in negotiation training.

(1) Language Proficiency. Language proficiency is a training requirement that instructs SOF personnel in different languages. Each SOF element is required to have a specific number of personnel trained in language. However, this number may vary between SOF units. Once a member has been trained it is important to keep them trained. The scorecard metric (a percentage) adds the total amount initially trained and those that have maintained proficiency in a required language and divides it against the total number required to be trained. Along with speaking a language, understanding the cultures of different partners is also important.

(2) Percent of Force Trained on Negotiation Skills. Receiving training in cultural awareness and different types of negotiation skills also prepares SOF personnel to deal with activities that will take place in the internal process. Just like language training, the scorecard metric (a percent) adds the total number of individuals trained and divides it by the total number that must be trained. Combining all the objectives of learning and growth with good leadership will properly equip SOF personnel with the tools to have a positive impact on the GSN.

The BSC applies a great deal of emphasis in learning and growth because of the importance to setting all personnel up for success. Creating a solid foundation helps align the activities with strategy and begins to develop SME's which are critical in the internal perspective. Being able to link functional knowledge, intelligence capabilities and soft communication skills forms a well-rounded SOF operator.

E. SUMMARY

The BSC illustrates a method to measure the effectiveness of the GSN by linking the strategy map to activities that develop options as well as increase the diversity of options provided to decision makers. The BSC, a proven tool implemented in multiple Fortune 1000 companies, effectively measures activities and promoted behavior to achieve financial goals. Converting the financial perspective into a decision maker perspective designed to create options is the key difference between the two BSCs. In both environments, the BSC changes as the environment changes. The objectives, measures and weights change accordingly to create the greatest choices possible for the decision makers. Having an adjustable tool for a dynamic environment lends the flexibility the GSN needs to guide SOF operators towards the strategy of creating options.

VI. CONCLUSION

A. MAJOR FINDINGS

We present the following major findings of this project as they relate to the questions posed in our research objective section.

1. How to Measure Value Provided by the GSN?

a. Options as a Measure of Return

A major finding of this project is the idea that the value of the GSN should be measured in the quality and diversity of options created by the network to deal with crisis and opportunity created by the actions of terrorist networks. In our model, options are either military or informational mechanisms that can counter the negative effects of terrorist activity. Use of these mechanisms will result in a net positive benefit for the United States. These options involve a range of partnership from unilateral to non-attributable and this creates diversity. Authority to employ these mechanisms is transferred from civilian decision makers such as the National Security Council through geographic combatant commands and chiefs of mission to deployed task forces pursing counterterrorism strategies. The options created by deployed units should reflect the preferences of these decision makers.

2. What Metrics are Appropriate to Measure or Gauge the Effectiveness of a SOF Network?

a. Focus on Operations, Intelligence, Communications and Security Force Assistance

We argue that deployed task forces should employ a product-leadership style strategy seeking production of the highest quality options possible, while maintaining access to diversity among these options. Identifying this as a priority, task forces can align day-to-day initiatives and activities towards these targets of quality and diversity. By focusing on these aspects, task forces will satisfy primary customers such as the geographic combatant commands, theatre special operations commanders, and chiefs of mission.

This project provides suggestions for quantifying the value of the following initiatives of task forces: operations management, intelligence, communications, and security force assistance. In this project, we link these initiatives to the criteria defining a customer's interpretation of quality through objectives that measure levels of activity and success. As suggested by many balanced scorecard experts, task forces should develop their own metrics tailored for their specific situations. In crafting the generic metrics for our model, we drew on a collective 32 years of experience including deployments to JSOTFs, CJSOTFs, JTFs, and multiple JCETs in various theatres. Deployed task forces should conduct their own assessments using our model as a starting point.

3. How can Lower Tier USSOCOM Unit's Activities Assess Performance?

a. BSC as a Tool that Links Strategy to Day-to-day Operations

Lower tier units within USSOCOM can use this BSC tool to link their everyday actions to the enterprise strategy of *Expand the Global SOF Network* by aligning their activities toward the output of high quality and diverse options. If task forces measure their value in options-created as suggested by this model, units preparing for deployment can more accurately assess and plan their activities while on deployment. The measurement of options will serve as a basis, providing a snapshot of the state-of-a-network before deployment. Armed with this snapshot, lower units can plan how they will attempt to improve the network's position during their time deployed to the task force that manages the network. We envision use of this model by units to assess the health of the options they have created or maintained access to in their respective areas of operations.

Collectively, these concepts and tools represent a way of thinking about the purpose of a Global SOF Network and the role of lower tier units in contributing to the value of the network. These concepts and tools can also serve as a template from which to build geographic or domain-specific network scorecards.

B. LIMITATIONS

1. Our Own Model

This project is limited by the fact that the model is our own construct based on a modification of established academic theory. While there is a historical track record of balanced scorecards applied in both the private and public sectors, our application is certainly unique and new. Our research has been applied to develop concepts and tools to increase the ability of the GSN to create options. The methodology we used consisted of brainstorming with SOF peers and NPS faculty with expertise in strategy and the BSC.

2. No Data

Because the GSN is currently conducting its initial implementation, no data or tests have yet been conducted to determine the value it provides. This project created a strategy map and BSC to establish objectives with measurements that can be assessed, but does not use real world data to test outcomes resulting from their use. Thus, these tools should be considered preliminary and should be used with oversight until measures are tested and refined.

3. Limited Scope

The scope of our project specifically focused only on the military and information instruments of national power and disregarded the diplomatic and economic aspects. We started with the simple DIME acronym for instruments of national power, but had to simplify this further to keep the scope achievable. Simplification of SOFs 11 core activities does not represent the uniqueness of each mission set. Much more complicated constructs to describe the instruments of national power exist; the scope was kept narrow to allow for more emphasis on the military and information approach. Task forces wishing to implement this model should identify the most applicable instruments of national power for their peculiar situation.

C. FUTURE RESEARCH

1. Option Criteria

The SOF community is known for its innovation and creativity. A thorough canvassing of operators and support personnel would yield metrics and measurements unthinkable to us in our research. If properly framed with background on the BSC, this could be accomplished through e-mail surveys.

a. Refinement, Validation, and Expansion through Interviews

Specifically, future research should focus on the option criteria that make up the value proposition. This research could be conducted through interviews of key decision makers and commands of the customer level. Ideally this focus would retain the simplicity that we established, but validate the importance of each criterion as perceived by the interviewees.

Interviews with SOF commanders should be conducted to scrutinize the objectives and measures developed with our project. These interviews would suggest possible adjustments based on current conditions. Upon completion of interviews, we recommend implementing the BSC into one AO to conduct a proof of concept test and begin collecting data to be analyzed. Other areas of future research should also consider all available instruments of national power—not just the military and information aspects covered within this research.

In order for *Expand the Global SOF Network* to work, USSOCOM will need to garner the support of senior enlisted across SOF. Many of the initiatives and objectives we identified during this project are tied to successful buy in from Non-commissioned officers. Some type of survey or interview research identifying how the enlisted community perceives the strategy shift would be helpful in refinement of the objectives and initiatives.

D. RECOMMENDATONS

Our recommendations are in two parts. First, we recommend the SOF community measure the value of a partnership network through the diversity and quality of the policy options that it creates or with which it maintains access. Second, we recommend units forward deployed to task forces to implement Balanced Scorecards to align their initiatives and activities with the enterprise strategy of *Expand the Global SOF Network*.

We recommend implementing the strategy map and BSC in a proof-of-concept test within one AO. The test should validate criteria, objectives, and initiatives we included in our model. The implementation will allow for data to be collected and analyzed. It will also determine if the BSC is successful in creating options. Continuous refinement should occur to improve the BSC as well as keep it concurrent with the changing environment.

Deployed task forces can tailor this BSC to their own preferences. Where we suggested the use of four criteria to measure quality in our value proposition, another user could include more or less meeting the needs of commanders in their customer level. We would caution discarding the requirement for diversity. This is because having only one type of option might result in predictability of action.

E. CONTRIBUTIONS

This project has identified the value that a partnership network can contribute to counterterrorism operations in complex environments. It should be measured in the options that it creates to deal with opportunities and crises. We also analyzed how deployed task forces can align their initiatives and activities to maximize their output of options. Similar to the requirement for the enterprise to take ownership of the strategy for it to be a success, for our BSC model to succeed, the enterprise will also need to take ownership of it, make it their own and tailor the details to meet their individual part of the network.

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APPENDIX SUPPORTING DIAGRAMS



BSC for the Global SOF Network

Organizational level	Initiatives	Objectives / Process	Measures		Scoring method	Actual score	Target	% of Target	Weight assigned	Weighted score
Decision-Maker Perspective			1. Existence of: (more is a better score)							
National Security Council, Chief of Mission		Diversity	A. Unilateral Information Option	D. Unilateral Military Option						
			B.Partnered Information Option	E.Partnered Military Option	1-6	3	6	50%	2.0%	1.0%
			C. Non-attrib Information Option	F. Non-attrib Military Option						
		Connectivity	1.Partner Importance		1-100	90	85	106%	3.0%	3.2%
Customer Perspective		Liklihood of success	2 Mission success rates		%		90	0%	3.0%	0.0%
Geographic Combatant Commander, Theatre		Responsiveness	3. Time between decision to employ option and the result of	0 - 1 hour = 3 1 - 24 hours = 2 24 + hours = 1	Time	2	2.5	80%	3.0%	2.4%
		Vetted	4. vetted units (Leahy Law)		Yes/No	0	1	0%	3.0%	0.0%
	Operations Management	Evaluate Partners	1. Availability to functional units		%	78	80	98%	6.0%	5.9%
			2. % of partners evaluated		%	95	90	106%	6.0%	6.3%
Internal Perspective			3. Evaluation currency	0 - 6 months = 3 7-12 montths = 2 12+ months = 1	Time	1	1	100%	6.0%	6.0%
Joint Special Operations Task Force Commander, Joint Task Force Commander		Coordinate Engagement	4. Time between engagements	0 - 90 Days = 3 91-180 Days = 2 181 + Days = 1	Time	1	1	100%	6.0%	6.0%
	Intelligence	Share Information	5. Information consumed that is shared		%	75	90	83%	6.0%	5.0%
		Use Reach back	6. Bandwidth	T-3 = 3 Ethernet = 2 T-1 = 1	Through put	48	80	60%	6.0%	3.6%
	Communication	Make Relationships	7. Interactions - Physical, Voice, Data (# of contacts)		#	49	50	98%	6.0%	5.9%
		Effectively Message	8. Media Reach - percent of		#	80	80	100%	6.0%	6.0%
	Security Force Assessment	Enhance Partners	9. % of request fulfilled		%	78	90	87%	6.0%	5.2%
Learning and Growth (Man, Train & Equip Perspective)	Training	Knowledge of resource systems	1. Functional level knowledge of resource authorities (1206, CMO, M2M) - subjective		%	95	90	106%	8.0%	8.4%
		Knowledge of Intelligence capabilities	2. % of force trained on intelligence sharing		%	90	90	100%	8.0%	8.0%
Functional Unit Commanding Officer's View		Communication Soft Skills	3. Language proficiency		%	100	95	105%	8.0%	8.4%
			4. % of force trained on negotiation skills		%	100	95	105%	8.0%	8.4%
						Total			100.0%	90%

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